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Transcending the Individualist
Paradigm in Sexual Orientation
Antidiscrimination Law
Holning Laut
Many businesses restrict their goods and services to opposite-sex cou-
ples. These businesses range from travel groups for straight couples only,
to ballroom dance studios that require men to dance with women, to pho-
tographers who refuse to take pictures of same-sex couples. Recently, these
businesses have generated a fair amount of controversy. For example,
eHarmony, the popular online dating service, has spawned controversy by
refusing to match same-sex couples, claiming that its patented compatibil-
ity test is tailored for opposite-sex pairings.1 Editorialists, such as
Michelangelo Signorile, have accused eHarmony of unjust discrimination.2
Sandals, the beachfront resort chain, is another source of recent
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1. A former version of eHarmony's website explained that "eHarmony does not offer same sex
matching services ... [because] eHarmony's research has only examined heterosexual relationships."
See Michelangelo Signorile, Point and Lick: What David Brooks Doesn't Know Can't Hurt Him, N.Y.
PREss, Nov. 11, 2003, at I (quoting a former version of eHarmony's website). Although eHarmony has
removed the explanation from its website, it still does not offer same-sex matching. See eHarmony,
http://www.eharmony.com (last visited Dec. 20, 2005). On the controversial nature of eHarmony's
policy, see, for example, Signorile, supra (criticizing eHarmony's policy); Lisa Baertlein, Dating Site
eHarmony Has 436 Questions for You, USA TODAY, June 2, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/
webguide/internetlife/2004-06-02-eharmonyx.htm (describing eHarmony's policy as controversial).
2. See Signorile, supra note 1; see also Jennifer Hahn, Love Machines, L.A. CITY BEAT, Feb.
10, 2005, at I (quoting a commentator: "I don't see [eHarmony's policy] as anything more than rhetoric
or an excuse for ... discrimination... I don't feel that they should be turning anyone away."); Rebecca
Traister, My Date with Mr. eHarnony, SALON.COM, June 10, 2005, http://www.salon.com/
mwt/feature/2005/06/l 0/warren/index.html (noting that the author found it "disturbing" that eHarmony
"won't match gays").
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controversy. Mayor Ken Livingston banned Sandals from advertising in the
London Underground because Sandals' romantic getaways only
accommodated opposite-sex couples. Subsequently, Sandals volunteered to
alter its restrictive policy.'
Is criticism against these businesses justified? In the individualist
paradigm,4 Sandals, under its former policy, may seem no more culpable of
discrimination than a retailer that sells only women's bras. The bra retailer
has no legal or moral obligation to carry men's underwear or even a bra
that fits men. Any individual man can walk into the bra shop, buy a bra,
and wear it as he pleases. Similarly, any individual gay man could have
accessed Sandals, so long as he brought a female companion. In the indi-
vidualist paradigm, requiring Sandals to alter its product can be equated
with requiring the bra shop to start selling boxer shorts just to accommo-
date men. In the individualist paradigm, Sandals and the bra retailer seem
innocuously similar.'
In this Essay, I introduce a theory of couples' aggregate rights, which
supports the intuition-held by critics of Sandals and eHarmony-that
businesses should not distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex cou-
ples. Numerous moral theorists have persuasively argued that protecting
human dignity requires protecting people against discrimination on the ba-
sis of sexual orientation.6 To take seriously this normative claim against
sexual orientation discrimination, jurists must recognize the aggregate
moral rights7 of couples. Such couples' rights are irreducible to the
3. Press Release, Greater London Authority, Mayor Hails Sandals Decision as Victory Against
Discrimination (Oct. 13, 2004).
4. By referring to the individualist paradigm, I am referring to a paradigm in which rights are
accorded only to individuals, and individuals are the analytical units among which differentiation is
proscribed by antidiscrimination laws. In the couples' rights paradigm that I propose below, rights are
accorded to both individuals and couples, and both individuals and couples are analytical units among
which antidiscrimination laws proscribe differentiation.
5. 1 elaborate on this point infra, at Part II.D.I., in which I consider the individual's claim
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as well as the basis of sex. I also consider the
individual's freedoms of intimate association and expression. Ultimately, my analyses highlight the
individualist paradigm's shortcomings.
6. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 184-210 (1999) (offering "a
defense of lesbian and gay rights" based on moral philosophy); Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to
Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age, 212 NEW LEFT REV. 68, 77-78 (1995)
(discussing members of "despised sexualities" and "the injustice they suffer"). Putting theory to
practice, the human rights bodies of the United Nations have endorsed the idea that discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation compromises human dignity. See Holning Lau, Comment, Sexual
Orientation: Testing the Universality of International Human Rights Law, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1689,
1700-02 (2004) (summarizing the United Nations' position on sexual orientation discrimination). For a
counterargument against sexual orientation rights, see John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual
Orientation, " 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1063 (1994) (asserting a "natural law" argument to
justify discrimination against sexual minorities).
7. 1 use the term "moral rights" to refer to rights that derive from moral philosophy as opposed
to legal sources. In this Essay, I first propose couples' moral rights by drawing on existing moral
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individual rights of the couple's individual members. In a couples' rights
paradigm, eHarmony and Sandals are distinguishable from the hypothetical
bra retailer and are more akin to a shop that has a "No Blacks" sign adorn-
ing its window. Relying on my theory of couples' rights, I propose a model
public accommodations law to govern couple-oriented business establish-
ments. I also highlight the theory's potential implications in other legal
contexts, such as privacy and marriage law.
In proposing this theory, I borrow loosely from existing human rights
literature that explores ethnic minorities' group rights. The basic premise
of group rights-and of the couples' rights I propose-is that an individ-
ual's identity is inextricably linked to her memberships in certain social
collectives. Accordingly, protecting that individual requires not only pro-
tecting her individual right to associate with those collective entities, but
also protecting those entities' aggregate rights to develop.
In the context of sexual orientation, the couple and the community are
two types of social collectives that shape an individual's sense of self. It
follows, then, that three types of sexual orientation rights merit protec-
tion: individual rights, couples' rights, and group rights. Between the two
types of aggregate rights in this triumvirate-couples' rights and group
rights-the former are particularly discussion-worthy because one's sexual
orientation classification is necessarily defined by whom she desires to
partner with, regardless of whether she identifies with a larger sexual orien-
tation group.' Thus, in this Essay, I focus on couples' rights and leave sex-
ual minority9 group rights for a future project.
The remainder of this Essay unfolds in four parts. Part I provides the
political backdrop. In light of Lawrence v. Texas"° and the movement for
theories. I then propose incorporating protections of couples' moral rights into public accommodations
laws, thus creating legal rights.
8. In a controversial practice, some people claim cultural and political membership in a gay or
lesbian community, but express no desire for same-sex partners. In those cases, group membership
shapes the individuals' cultural and political identity, but not their sexual orientation. See Michele J.
Eliason & Kris S. Moran, Lesbians Define Themselves: Diversity in Lesbian Identification, 3 J. GAY
LESBIAN & BISEXUAL IDENTITY 47 (1998) (contrasting lesbianism as a political identity with
lesbianism as a sexual identity); Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the
Risk of Essentialism, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 43, 66 n.80 (1994) ("Within the lesbian community
there has been much debate over the concept of 'political lesbian,' i.e., someone who identifies as
lesbian because of her feminist politics, but who is not sexual with women.").
When I use the terms "gay" and "lesbian" in this Essay, I use them as they are commonly
understood: to refer to homosexuals. In some instances, however, I will distinguish between
"homosexuals" and "gays and lesbians" because not all homosexuals identify with a gay or lesbian
community. See Eartha Jane Melzer & Steve Koval, Wilson Blocks Boykin From Million More Stage,
WASH. BLADE, Oct. 15, 2005, available at http://www.washblade.conthelatest/
thelatest.cfm?blog-id=2978 (noting that the civil rights leader Cleo Manago eschews the "gay" label
and identifies as "same gender loving" because he does not identify with the gay community).
9. In this Essay, I use the term "sexual minority" as shorthand for "sexual orientation minority,"
i.e., to refer to all people who do not identify as heterosexual.
10. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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same-sex marriage, I address why discussing same-sex couples in the sepa-
rate context of business establishments matters. In Part II, I lay out the
theory for couples' aggregate rights, grounding it in existing literature on
aggregate rights. In doing so, I offer a broad definition of "couple"--one
that includes long-term partners, short-term partners, and potential part-
ners, such as two people who might meet through a dating service. I also
discuss how, as analytical frameworks, individual rights and couples'
rights produce disparate legal outcomes. In Part III, I incorporate couples'
rights into a model public accommodations law and discuss states of ex-
ception, in which couple-oriented businesses should be permitted to main-
tain a heterosexual (or homosexual) presumption. Finally, in the
Conclusion, I summarize this Essay's arguments and highlight their poten-
tial implications outside of the public accommodations context.
I
THE BACKDROP: SEXUAL ORIENTATION POST-LwENCE
Amid the present debate over same-sex marriage, it might seem curi-
ous that I have chosen to focus my attention not on marriage, but on same-
sex couples' access to business establishments. Indeed, Andrew Sullivan
once suggested that same-sex marriage will be a virtual panacea to the in-
justices suffered by gays and lesbians." Does this Essay have its eye on the
wrong ball?
This Part provides background on the importance of enabling same-
sex couples' access to business establishments. Part L.A introduces the pub-
lic-private dichotomy that has characterized advances in sexual orientation
rights. While American law has come to protect the lives of sexual minori-
ties in their own homes, it still underprotects the equality of sexual minori-
ties in public contexts. Part I.B discusses efforts at developing sexual
orientation rights in the public sphere. While most of these efforts have
focused on marriage, I contend that access to businesses also warrants at-
tention and is best addressed through a couples' rights paradigm.
A. Behind Bedroom Doors:
Protecting Sexual Minorities in the Private Sphere
Gay rights advocates rejoiced when the Supreme Court held in
Lawrence v. Texas that criminalizing consensual same-sex sodomy vio-
lated the Constitution's protection of substantive due process. 2 Some went
so far as to describe Lawrence as the "Brown v. Board of gay and lesbian
11. See ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY
180-85 (1995) (contending that "[i]f nothing else were done at all, and gay marriage were legalized,
ninety percent of the political work necessary to achieve gay and lesbian equality would have been
achieved. It is ultimately the only reform that truly matters.").
12. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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America."' 3 Despite the celebration, however, commentators have noted
that Lawrence left something to be desired by focusing so much on the pri-
vate sphere of same-sex relationships.' 4 In the majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy wrote:
[L]iberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex.... The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private
lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.... The
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify
its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.' 5
Lawrence signifies an acceptance of same-sex relations within the
private realm. By focusing on the private sphere, however, it falls short of
affording sexual minorities what philosophers refer to as a moral right to
recognition. Sexual minorities' right to recognition is a right to live visibly
non-heterosexual lifestyles while receiving recognition and approval of
those lifestyles from other persons.16 As philosopher Charles Taylor ex-
plained, "Nonrecognition or misrecognition... can be a form of
oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of
being."' 7 Tolerance of same-sex conduct behind closed doors does not ade-
quately protect sexual minorities' moral rights. In this regard, Lawrence
falls short. Kennedy's opinion invoked the rhetoric of moral rights, holding
that the criminalization of same-sex sodomy "demeans the lives of
homosexual persons" and subjects them to unwarranted "stigma."'"
However, Lawrence is necessary but not sufficient to protect sexual
13. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1895 (2004). See also Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty
of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1399 n.2 (2004) (listing instances in which
commentators have compared Lawrence to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
14. See Franke, supra note 13, at 1401-04 (arguing that Lawrence only protected a "privatized
liberty"). But see Tribe, supra note 13, at 1948 ("Some argue that Lawrence is merely about
decriminalizing closeted consensual intimacies between same-sex partners .... This argument,
however, seems transparently weak.").
15. 539 U.S. at 572, 578-79 (emphases added).
16. The definition of sexual minorities' right to recognition, which I offer here, draws on the
work of other recognition theorists. See Axel Honneth, Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a
Conception of Morality Based on the Theory of Recognition, 20 POL. THEORY 187, 188-89, 91 (1992)
("[W]e owe our integrity ... to the receipt of approval or recognition from other persons ....
[Nonrecognition] is injurious because it impairs.., persons in their positive understanding of self-an
understanding acquired by intersubjective means .... [Nonrecognition includes] denigration of
individual or collective life-styles."); CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND "THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION" 25-26 (1992) ("Nonrecognition or misrecoguition... can inflict a grievous wound,
saddling [people] with crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy .. [but] a vital
human need."). See also Fraser, supra note 6, at 77 ("[T]he injustice [that sexual minorities] suffer is
quintessentially a matter of recognition.").
17. TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 25.
18. 539 U.S. at 575.
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minorities' moral rights because decriminalizing private conduct fails to
eradicate the stigma suffered by sexual minorities in the public realm.
Focusing on the private sphere confines sexual minorities' liberty interests
to their bedrooms, allowing a heteronormative culture to persist beyond
their bedroom doors.
The dichotomous public-private treatment of sexual minorities is not
unique to Lawrence. The armed forces' "Don't Ask, Don't Tell Policy"' 9 is
another example. The policy-which prohibits openly gay, lesbian, and
bisexual individuals from serving in the forces-suggests that there is noth-
ing wrong with being gay, lesbian, or bisexual, so long as one keeps her
sexual orientation private.20 Another example arises in asylum law. The
law recognizes gays and lesbians as a protected social group for the pur-
pose of asylum claims,2' but an immigration judge recently held that asy-
lum should be granted to gays and lesbians only when they are incapable of
veiling their sexual orientation in public.22 In that case, a Los Angeles im-
migration judge ordered the deportation of a gay asylum-seeker because "if
he returned to Mexico in some [other] community... it would not be
obvious that he would be homosexual unless he made that ... obvious
himself."23 This ruling implies that the asylum-seeker had a duty to sup-
press his openly gay lifestyle and to confine his sexual orientation to the
private sphere.
B. Into the Public Sphere
Many advocates of sexual orientation rights are hopeful that Lawrence
will soon lead to greater rights for sexual minorities in the public sphere.
19. Pub. L. No. 103-160, 107 Stat. 1670 (1993) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000))
(providing for "separation from the armed forces" for "engag[ing] in, attempt[ing] to engage in, or
solicit[ing] another to engage in a homosexual act"; for "stat[ing] that [one] is a homosexual or
bisexual"; and for "marr[ying] or attempt[ing] to marry a person known to be of the same biological
sex.").
20. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S. Military's
Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1997) (discussing how "the Don't Ask,
Don't Tell policy permits gay people to serve in the military... [but also] does more than mandate
silence; it compels gay servicemembers to make involuntary and false affirmations of a heterosexual
identity that is not their own.").
21. In 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno issued a directive mandating that immigration judges
regard homosexuality as a basis for claiming membership in a particular "social group" protected by
asylum laws. See Att'y Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994).
22. See In re Soto Vega, No. A 95 880 786 (IJ L.A. Cal. Jan. 21, 2003), cited in Brief for the
Appellant, Soto Vega v. Ashcroft, No. 04-70868 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-70868), available at
http://www.lambdalegal.orgibinary-data/LAMBDAPDF/pdf/319.pdf).
23. Press Release, Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal Asks Federal Appeals Court to Grant Asylum
to Gay Mexican Immigrant Who Suffered Severe Persecution from Police and Public (Oct. 26, 2004)
(quoting the unnamed immigration judge). For additional examples of how the law pressures gays and
lesbians to suppress their sexual orientation in the public sphere, see generally Kenji Yoshino,
Covering, I ll YALE L.J. 769 (2002). Yoshino discusses demands on gays and lesbians to "pass" (i.e.,
hide) and to "cover" (i.e., downplay) their sexual orientation in public. Id. at 811-65.
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This hope has manifested itself most visibly in the mobilization for same-
sex marriage. Indeed, marriage would place a stamp of recognition upon
same-sex couples. I contend, however, that focusing on marriage alone is
not in sexual minorities' best interests. Instead, advocates of social justice
should also direct attention at public accommodations, and this Essay of-
fers a new analytical paradigm for doing so.
One problem with focusing exclusively on same-sex marriage is a
matter of practicality: the push for same-sex marriage has garnered only
marginal success. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has legalized
same-sex marriage,24 and San Francisco, New Paltz (New York), and other
local jurisdictions issued same-sex marriage licenses for brief periods of
time. However, a California court has already invalidated the licenses
granted in San Francisco." Opponents are presently challenging in court
the licenses issued in other local jurisdictions.2 6  The events in
Massachusetts, San Francisco, and New Paltz contributed to a backlash,
resulting in thirteen states passing constitutional amendments that ban
same-sex marriage and the President proposing a similar amendment on the
federal level.2 Most recently, in September 2005, the California legislature
passed a same-sex marriage bill, which the governor vetoed.2
In light of these setbacks, advocates ought to consider additional
means of furthering sexual minorities' recognition rights. Laws governing
business establishments provide a viable route. Many local public accom-
modations laws already prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation, 29  and some of those laws broadly construe public
24. On November 18, 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that excluding
same-sex couples from civil marriage violated the Massachusetts constitution. Goodridge v. Dep't of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). On February 3, 2004, the same court, responding to the
Massachusetts Senate's request for an advisory opinion, held that civil unions could not substitute
marriage for same-sex couples. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). At
midnight on May 16, 2004, the Goodridge opinion went into effect and since then Massachusetts has
been issuing same-sex marriage licenses. See Yvonne Abraham & Rick Klein, Free to Marry: Historic
Date Arrives for Same-Sex Couples in Massachusetts, BOSTON GLOBE, May 17, 2004, at A 1.
25. See Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004); Bob Egelko, Top
State Court Voids S.F. 's Gay Marriages, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13, 2004, at Al.
26. See John Caldwell, People of the Year: The Mayors, THE ADVOCATE, Dec. 21, 2004, at 34
(summarizing the status of same-sex marriage licenses issued by municipalities).
27. See id. See also Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L.
REV. 431, 459-66 (2005) (discussing the backlash against same-sex marriage, noting contributing
factors including the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, legalization of same-sex
marriage in parts of Canada, and the events in Massachusetts, San Francisco, and New Paltz).
28. Nancy Vogel & Jordan Rau, Schwarzenegger Vetoes Same-Sex Marriage Bill, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2005, at 1.
29. At the time of this writing, fifteen states and the District of Columbia have public
accommodations laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation: California,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51
(Deering 2005) (extended by case law to cover sexual orientation in Curran v. Mount Diablo Council
of the Boy Scouts, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 338 (Ct. App. 1983)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46A-81C
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accommodations to include everything from public parks to commercial
retailers.3" Protecting same-sex couples' access to business establishments
would be a valuable, intermediate step toward securing same-sex marriage,
rights because it would foster visibility-thus positively altering the public
perception---of sexual minorities.3
Yet despite the existence of public accommodations laws that cover
sexual orientation, the laws themselves do not suffice to protect sexual mi-
norities' recognition rights from restrictive business policies. Even though
sexual minorities formally have access to business establishments, they are
often required to assume pseudonymous heterosexual identities to access
those accommodations. Many commercial products and services-such as
ballroom dance studios and romantic beach resorts-formally welcome
sexual minorities as long as they suppress their sexual orientation and con-
form to heterosexual norms by coupling with members of the opposite sex.
As Cheshire Calhoun once noted, "Unlike 'the love that dare not speak its
name,' heterosexuality is the love whose name is continually spoken in the
everyday routines and institutions of public social life."32 Businesses that
(West 2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.31 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 368-1 (2004) (limited to
entities receiving state financial assistance); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102 (2001); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4591-94-F (2004); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5 (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 272, § 98 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:17
(LexisNexis 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. § 28-1-2 (2004); N.Y. EXEC.
LAW §§ 296, 296-a (McKinney 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502
(2005); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 106.52 (West 2002). In addition, Nevada's laws declare that sexual
orientation discrimination in public accommodations contravenes public policy; however, Nevada does
not yet provide a remedy for such discrimination. See NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 233.010.2 (West 2005).
Many municipalities have public accommodations laws that protect against sexual orientation
discrimination. These cities range from New York City to Lawrence, Kansas. For a table tracking the
jurisdictions with public accommodations law covering sexual orientation, see Lambda Legal,
Summary of States, Cities, and Counties Which Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation,
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/resources.html?record=217 (last visited on Apr. 21,
2005).
30. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2002) (denoting "all business establishments" as
public accommodations); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (West 2002) (defining public accommodations to
include any "retail shop, store, establishment, or concession dealing with goods or services of any
kind.").
31. While greater visibility could possibly lead to increased hostility towards sexual minorities, I
hypothesize that it would likely improve the public perception of sexual minorities because
homophobia is, in large part, a product of ignorance. See Judd Marmor, Overview: The Multiple Roots
of Homosexual Behavior, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR, A MODERN REAPPRAISAL 19 (Judd Marmor ed.,
1980) (explaining that homophobia stems, in part, from ignorance); Gregory M. Herek & John P.
Capitanio, "Some of My Best Friends": Intergroup Contact, Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals'
Attitudes Toward Gay Men and Lesbians, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 412 (1996)
(reporting data showing that heterosexuals who interact with gays and lesbians have significantly more
favorable attitudes toward gays and lesbians than heterosexuals without such relationships). For a well-
articulated argument that the best road to same-sex marriage is one of incremental reform, see WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS (2001).




maintain restrictive policies against same-sex couples are institutions that
fit Calhoun's description.
These heteronormative presumptions in business practices prompt the
questions: How can public accommodations laws better protect sexual
minorities? How can sexual minorities achieve the visibility and recogni-
tion that they seek in commercial spaces? Perhaps the lesbian at the ball-
room dance competition can wear a rainbow flag to proclaim her pride. A
more natural way for the lesbian to convey her identity, however, would be
for her to convey her coupling preference. 3 By protecting diverse couples'
aggregate right to access business establishments-instead of focusing on
individuals' right of access-this Essay's proposed public accommodations
law would provide access to business establishments for sexual minorities
qua sexual minorities, instead of sexual minorities masquerading under the
guise of heterosexuality.
Whether sexual minorities have a right to access public accommoda-
tions as nontraditional couples is a question that carries significant moral
weight. Since the heyday of the civil rights movement, many legal scholars
have viewed access to public accommodations, including business estab-
lishments, as an essential component of citizenship. 4 The Supreme Court
has also recognized that public accommodations laws protect human dig-
nity. Discussing the 1964 Civil Rights Act's public accommodations provi-
sion, for example, the Court noted the "deprivation of personal dignity that
surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments."3 In
light of this precedent, recognition of same-sex couples in business estab-
lishments warrants attention along with the lively debate over same-sex
marriage.
Increasing the visibility of same-sex couples outside of the marriage
context is also desirable because it does not implicate all the objections that
some queer theorists have launched against same-sex marriage. Michael
Warner, for example, argues that same-sex marriage pressures gays and
lesbians to become settled, monogamous, gender-conforming, long-term
partners who restrict their sex acts to the purely "vanilla"; consequently,
33. Cf RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW 236 (1988)
("[A]cting as a couple tends, as much as anything short of saying one is gay, to project one's affectional
preferences into the public realm.").
34. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1615-17, 1634 (2001) (discussing cultural citizenship, noting that citizenship "is
not purely a creature of the state .... Implicitly, the law has recognized that markets have a role in
constituting citizenship. Indeed, public accommodations laws constitute one example of that
acknowledgment. Markets seek consumers and thereby bring previously excluded individuals into
central social dynamics."); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 247-55 (1964) (Douglas & Goldberg, JJ.,
concurring) (suggesting that discrimination in public accommodations perpetuates a culture of second-
class citizenship).
35. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (quoting the Senate
Commerce Committee speaking on the Civil Rights Act of 1964) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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same-sex marriage further stigmatizes sexual minorities who do not mimic
the roles of Ozzie and Harriet.3 6 With the exception of some businesses-
sucn as weading planners-couple-oriented businesses generally are not as
symbolically loaded as the institution of marriage. Protecting same-sex
couples' access to business establishments would shine recognition on a
broader range of partnerships than does marriage. Moreover, while the
government affirmatively encourages marriage by providing married cou-
ples with special rights and benefits, the government would not be affirma-
tively encouraging coupling just by protecting couples' access to
businesses.37 Thus, protecting couples' access to businesses neither pres-
sures couples to mimic Ozzie and Harriet nor pressures individuals to cou-
ple in the first place.
Interestingly, some states, such as Illinois, simultaneously proscribe
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in public accommodations
while explicitly prohibiting same-sex marriage.38 This situation creates un-
certain dynamics for same-sex couples. If the state will not recognize the
same-sex couple through marriage, will it protect the same-sex couple in
other aspects of the public sphere? Does Illinois's public accommodations
law protect the same-sex couple or only the individual? The remainder of
this Essay articulates a theory of couples' moral rights and argues for in-
corporating protection of those moral rights into a public accommodations
law that-unlike Illinois's public accommodations law-clearly protects
the couple as a collective entity.
II
RIGHTS OF THE COUPLE
If a group enjoys a distinct mode of life and if that mode of life
takes a collective form, perhaps our moral recognition of that mode
of life has to be directed towards the group collectively rather than
to its members severally.... [S]ome of what is fundamentally
important for people relates to identities that they can possess and
to practices in which they can engage only in association with
36. See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF
QUEER LIFE 41-80 (1999).
37. "The state not only recognizes marriage, it encourages marriage. Being married is a legal
status that entails a broad range of associated rights and benefits for the couple." WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED
COMMITMENT 66 (1996) (emphasis added). See also Chai R. Feldblum, Gay is Good: The Moral Case
for Marriage Equality and More, 17 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 139, 153 (2005) ("The reality today is that
society expects that men and women will get married, and those who do not are viewed with pity and in
many cases disfavor when they fail to 'achieve' this 'goal.').
38. Compare 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102 (2001) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation in public accommodations) with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212(a)(5) (2001)
(prohibiting same-sex marriage in the State of Illinois), and 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/213.1 (2001)
(declaring same-sex marriage to be against public policy).
1280 [Vol. 94:1271
COUPLES' RIGHTS
others. Consequently, it can seem merely arbitrary to insist that
people can have rights only to goods that they can enjoy
individually and never to goods that they can enjoy only
collectively.39
The moral philosopher Peter Jones had ethnic minorities in mind
when he penned the above statement, but its logic lends itself well to the
context of sexual minorities.4" Accepting that justice requires moral recog-
nition of sexual minorities,41 one must question whether that moral recog-
nition should be directed solely at sexual minorities as individuals.
Throughout this Part, I draw loosely on the human rights literature
pertaining to ethnic minorities' group rights to develop aggregate rights in
the sexual orientation context. I discuss aggregate rights generally in Part
II.A. In Part II.B, I propose two types of aggregate rights in the sexual ori-
entation context--couples' rights and sexual minorities' group rights-and
focus on the former. In Part II.C, I clarify the scope of the term "couple" by
delineating three types of entities that merit moral recognition-long-term
couples, short-term couples, and potential couples. Finally, in Part II.D, I
discuss how the individual rights framework and couples' rights frame-
work produce disparate legal outcomes.
A. Groups and Group Rights
Western conceptions of rights have largely emphasized the central
importance of an individual's right to autonomous self-development. 2
Recent criticism of the individualist paradigm, however, questions the
paradigm's effectiveness in safeguarding human rights and argues that in-
dividuals do not develop their notions of self in an abstract vacuum. 43 This
scholarship posits instead that an individual's self-conception is very much
informed by her membership in larger social collectives.
Most existing literature on transcending individualism has focused on
ethnic minority groups' cultural rights." An individual's cultural identity is
integral to her sense of self, and an individual's cultural identity can be
39. Peter Jones, Group Rights and Group Oppression, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 353, 353 (1999).
40. See id.
41. I use the term "moral recognition" to refer to recognition that people deserve as a matter of
moral rights. On sexual minorities' moral rights to recognition, see supra note 16 and accompanying
text.
42. This focus on autonomous self-development grew from Enlightenment-era philosophy. See
generally THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT 1-30 (Lester G. Crocker ed., 1969) (providing an introduction
to political philosophy from the Enlightenment). Commentators sometimes use the term "self-
development" interchangeably with "self-determination" and "self-actualization."
43. See Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1219, 1246 (1991); Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,
18 POL. THEORY 6 (1990).
44. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS (1995). During the past decade, this seminal text propelled much of the discussion
of group fights.
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inextricably linked to her membership in cultural groups.45 Thus, to protect
the individual's right to self-development, 46 it is imperative to protect the
cuturai group on wnicn tne incivaual relies to develop her sense of self.
Without the larger cultural group, the individual can no longer fully de-
velop herself as an individual.
Before proceeding further with this discussion, it is useful to define
"groups" and "group rights." Insofar as moral rights are concerned, groups
have a primary defining feature: groups consist of individuals in relations
that play a fundamental role in those individuals' self-development. 47 Thus,
members cultivate their identities through the relations they develop in the
group. A shift in the intragroup relations changes the group identity and
simultaneously alters the identities of the group's individual members.48
Ethnic minorities often satisfy this definition of groups. Relations
within an ethnic minority group are often fundamental to the individual's
affirmation of self.49 This affirmative function of an ethnic group grows
from the group members' relations with each other-for example, sharing
common values with the group, speaking a common language with other
group members, or participating in cultural ceremonies. Without these self-
affirming intragroup relations, the individual's sense of self is compro-
mised.
What, then, are moral rights belonging to a group? Drawing from the
work of other theorists, I posit that group rights are characterized by three
necessary and sufficient components. First, group rights are rights to estab-
lish the institutional conditions necessary for the group's development."0
Second, in order for a group to have an aggregate right to a particular insti-
tutional condition, the request for that condition must grow out of an indi-
vidual human rights claim."1 Third, a group's membership must reach a
45. Id. at 89.
46. On the right to self-development, see supra note 42.
47. My definition of groups, based on intragroup relations, draws heavily on Carol Gould's
theorizing. See CAROL C. GOULD, GLOBALIZING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 119-21 (2004); id.
at 120 ("1 characterize a social group as an entity constituted by individuals-in-relations.").
48. See GOULD, supra note 47, at 120 (arguing that "a change in these [intra-group] relations
would therefore effect a change in the character of the entity itself... [and] the characters of the
individuals are transformed by the interactions between them."). Because I adopt a relational model of
groups, I eschew the idea that groups have essential or corporate identities. Cf Jones, supra note 39, at
361-64 (discussing the corporate theory to group rights).
49. One should note that the function of group identity is affirmative but not necessarily
transformative. Group membership need not transform an individual's sense of self in order to warrant
moral recognition.
50. Development should be construed to include both the group's emergence and its continued
vitality. This first component of my definition draws on Carol Gould's writing. See GOULD, supra note
47, at 124 ("The group rights that a cultural minority can bear are therefore rights to the cultural
conditions for the self-development or transformative activity of its members ... the group can make a
valid claim against the majority culture to provide the individuals with these conditions.").
51. Cf Eric J. Mitnick, Three Models of Group-Differentiated Rights, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 215, 217 (2004) ("Collective rights... remain legitimate only insofar as they benefit
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critical mass in order to exercise its aggregate rights, and the criteria for
this critical mass depend on the rights at stake.
5 2
Returning to the example of ethnic minorities will clarify this three-
part framework. Consider the assertion that groups have rights to institu-
tional conditions. While an individual has an independent right to exercise
her ethnic culture, her ethnic group can make a moral claim for the gov-
ernment to provide institutional conditions that preserve, protect, and le-
gitimize her group's culture, making her exercise possible. Examples
include institutionalizing a minority language (e.g., institutionalizing the
French language in part of Canada) or allowing a minority ethnic group to
govern itself in order to preserve its culture (e.g., institutionalizing limited
self-government for Native Americans).53 While the government accords
these rights to a group, individuals should have standing to speak on behalf
of the group to demand enforcement.54
Next, consider that the requested institutional conditions must grow
out of individual human rights claims. By calling for institutionalized mi-
nority language education, groups are appealing to individuals' language
rights, which are recognized as human rights.55 In contrast, if a group were
to call for laws that allow murder-even if murder is a defining factor of its
group identity-it would not satisfy the second component because one
cannot make an individual human rights claim to murder.
individuals.") (original emphasis). Most existing literature concerning group rights discusses group
rights in the context of individuals' cultural rights, which international charters and treaties recognize
as universal human rights. See S. James Anaya, On Justifying Special Ethnic Group Rights: Comments
on Pogge, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHXs 222-24 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997)
[hereinafter Shapiro & Kymlickal (suggesting that, while not all types of groups should have group
rights, ethnic groups should because international human rights law protects individuals' cultural rights,
which are often related to ethnicity).
52. For background on the critical mass component of group rights (also referred to as the
collective or aggregative component of group rights), see Jones, supra 39, at 357-61. But see GOULD,
supra note 47, at 119-121 (criticizing the aggregative reading of groups).
53. Native Americans have additional justifications for self-rule, such as the historical fact that
Native tribes were sovereign entities prior to conquest. However, Native Americans' normative claim
to cultural preservation is the justification that is most relevant to this Essay. See Rebecca Tsosie,
Tribalism, Constitutionalism, and Cultural Pluralism: Where Do Indigenous People Fit Within Civil
Society?, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 365 (2003) (explaining that Native Americans can articulate a
claim for self-government based on international norms of cultural rights); see also KYMLICKA, supra
note 44 at 29-30 (appealing to multiculturalism to argue for self-government rights of indigenous
peoples in North America).
54. 1 recognize that deciding which individuals should have authority to speak for a group can be
a difficult question-one which I cannot address adequately within the scope of this Essay. For a
related article, see William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997).
55. International human rights treaties protect individuals' rights to speak any language of their
choosing. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, para. 1, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 172 (forbidding state parties from discriminating on the basis of, inter alia, language);
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 2, para. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 4 (providing the same).
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Finally, consider the collective component of group rights. Although
there is no bright line for critical mass, the principle dictates that a group
must have enough members for implementation of the institutional condi-
tions to be feasible. For example, minority language education is feasible
only if there are enough affected students to sustain such a school system.
Ethnic minorities often satisfy critical mass and also articulate moral
claims for institutional conditions based on individual human rights, thus
voicing valid claims to group rights.
What are the dynamics between group rights and individual rights? By
their nature, the rights are intertwined. Group rights derive from the princi-
ple of individual self-development; however, they are not reducible to the
rights of individuals. For example, an individual qua individual cannot
demand self-government for herself only. But individuals can speak on
behalf of their group. Thus, an individual Native American can assert a
moral claim on behalf of her tribe, such as the moral claim to institutional-
ize Native American self-rule.56 Though the individual has a right to asso-
ciate with other tribe members and exercise tribal culture, those individual
rights are not synonymous with the group's aggregate right to self-
government.
I should note here that some aspects of group rights are controversial.
A debate exists over how to manage points of tension between group rights
and individual rights.57 Consider the tension that arises when an ethnic
group invokes culture to oppress women, and when a group invokes cul-
tural practices that compromise human rights of non-group members. To
the extent that these tensions carry into the couples' rights context, they
can be managed through mechanisms discussed below.58
B. Aggregate Rights in the Sexual Orientation Context
In light of the group rights framework, I contend that individuals'
sexual orientation rights are interrelated with the aggregate rights of both
couples and sexual minority communities. As a starting point, I accept an
argument moral philosophers have previously articulated, which is that
people should have the freedom to develop their self-understanding of sex-
ual orientation without subjection to discrimination because such
56. For more on the entanglement between individual rights and group rights, see Jones, supra
note 39, at 354-55.
57. For a discussion concerning the points of tension between group rights and individual rights,
see KYMLICKA, supra note 44, at 34-48.
58. On mechanisms for dealing with the tension between individual rights and aggregate rights,
see infra note 78; infra Part III.B.3. A debate also exists on whether group rights should be considered
human rights or rights by some other name. As this debate is only tangentially related to the topic at
hand, I will not explore it in this Essay. However, for background, see generally Peter Jones, Human
Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples' Rights, 21 HUm. RTs. Q. 80 (1999) (defending group rights as
human rights).
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discrimination compromises human dignity.59 Although some philosophers
dissent on this point,6° the idea has begun to achieve legitimacy in practice.
For example, the international human rights regime has adopted a sexual
orientation antidiscrimination principle.6'
Theorizing a principle of sexual orientation antidiscrimination first
requires an understanding of what constitutes a sexual orientation. One's
sexual orientation is necessarily characterized by the partner with whom
she desires to associate.62 Membership in a particular type of couple can
affirm an individual's sense of self, including her sense of sexual orienta-
tion.63 Under this logic, couples are collective entities that should be ac-
corded moral rights. Rights should also be accorded to larger social groups,
such as the gay community; however, I will not theorize those group-level
rights in this Essay. 64 Defining sexual minority groups and their respective
rights involves complexities that warrant consideration in a separate pro-
ject.65 Indeed, in discourse on sexual orientation, scholars disagree on how
to define particular minority groups. Commentators have clashed, for
59. For examples of philosophers who have made this claim, see supra note 6.
60. See, e.g., Finnis, supra note 6 (asserting a "natural law" argument to justify sexual orientation
discrimination).
61. For background on the United Nations human rights bodies' stance on sexual orientation, see
Lau, supra note 6.
62. I do not mean to suggest that individuals must couple to develop a full sense of sexual
orientation. The desire of partnering itself shapes one's notion of sexual orientation and some
individuals may be able to fully develop that sense without ever interacting with an actual partner.
However, those cases do not belie the fact that, as discussed below, many people do rely on interactions
to cultivate their sense of sexual orientation and thus suffer a wound when people direct discrimination
at couples. Similarly, even though some people can fully develop their cultural identity without
associating with a defined ethnic group, ethnic groups still warrant protections.
63. In this Essay, I focus on the fact that membership in a couple affects one's sense of sexual
orientation. I do recognize, however, that membership in a couple affects personal identities in
additional ways. For the present, I focus on the sexual orientation component of identity because it
most directly relates to the legal topic at hand, i.e., sexual orientation antidiscrimination law.
64. I am open to the possibility that polyamory may be a defining element of some individuals'
sexual identity and, thus, polyamorous unions may warrant some types of aggregate rights. However,
for the purposes of my current project on business establishments, I leave the question of polyamory for
another day because, without further research, it is unclear how feasible it would be to require business
establishments to provide equal access for couples, threesomes, foursomes, etc. Consider the difficulty
that would arise in determining how big a Sandals room must be to accommodate larger collective
entities. Cf Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1783-84 (2005)
(distinguishing same-sex marriage from polygamy based on functional-but not moral-reasons).
Additionally, based on existing theoretical literature, it is unclear whether the orientation and
numerosity components of sexual identity warrant identical degrees of moral recognition. For a
thoughtful defense of polyamory, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy
and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 227 (2004).
65. Some commentators have already begun to frame gay and lesbian rights as group rights. See,
e.g., WILLIAM F. FELICE, TAKING SUFFERING SERIOUSLY: THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE HUMAN
RIGHTS 46-47 (1996) ("[1]esbian and gay rights are group rights"); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 160-61 (1990) ("Today most gay and lesbian liberation advocates seek
not merely civil rights, but the affirmation of gay men and lesbians as social groups with specific
experiences and perspectives.").
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example, on what it means to be gay. Is gay identity a social construction,
political construction, biological category, or all or none of the above?66
Should we do away with the term "gay" and employ instead a classification
system modeled on the Kinsey six-step scale?6 7 Can a man occasionally
perform oral sex on other men but not identify as gay or bisexual? 68 These
are all questions that scholars continue to debate.
While there is disagreement over how to categorize different sexual
minority groups, little disagreement exists over the definition of sexual ori-
entation itself. According to the American Heritage Dictionary, sexual ori-
entation is the "direction of one's sexual interest towards members of the
same, opposite, or both sexes, ' 69 and it seems that this definition is widely
accepted. In reading this definition, one should interpret "sexual interest"
liberally, understanding that "sexual interest" need not directly relate to
sexual acts. Our sexual interests echo in various aspects of our lives. Sex-
ual interests define whom we want to date, before whom we feel comfort-
able appearing nude, whom we view as potential life partners, even whom
we wish to twirl and dip on the ballroom dance floor.
Based on this definition, one's sexual orientation is necessarily rela-
tional.7" Although an individual's sexual interests are internal, those inter-
ests are directed at the external: other individuals. The interpersonal bonds
that arise from one's sexual interests are integral to one's sense of her sex-
ual orientation.7' Accordingly, couple status satisfies the
66. For background on the debates over defining sexual identities, see NIKKI SULLIVAN, A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO QUEER THEORY 37-98 (2003). See also WAYNE BREKHUS, PEACOCKS,
CHAMELEONS, AND CENTAURS: GAY SUBURBIA AND THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL IDENTITY (2003)
(presenting an ethnographic study illustrating that gay individuals express their gay identities in
different ways, not necessarily subscribing to so-called gay culture).
67. The Kinsey scale measures an individual's sexual orientation from zero (exclusively
heterosexual) to six (exclusively homosexual) based on the individual's past sexual experiences. See
ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948).
68. See, e.g., JANIS S. BOHAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION: COMING TO TERMS 14-
17 (1996) (noting cultures, including Melanesian and African, in which same-sex sexual activity is
considered a rite of passage for individuals who identify as heterosexual).
69. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed.
2000). See also Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation
of "Sex, " "Gender, " and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV.
1, 23 (1995) (referring to "sexual orientation" as "the apparent or actual inclination(s) of sexual or
affectional interests or desires among humans toward members of the same sex, the other sex, or both
sexes.").
70. See Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal
History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV 1643, 1650 (1993) ("At some point, it
seems, almost definitionally, coupling or the desire to couple must figure in same-sex orientation. In the
words of the adage, 'It akes two women to make a lesbian."').
71. See Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Psychol. Ass'n et al. at 4-5, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (No. 02-102) [hereinafter APA Brief] ("Sexual orientation is therefore integrally linked to the
close bonds that human beings form with others to meet their personal needs for love, attachment, and
intimacy. These bonds also encompass nonsexual physical affection between partners, shared goals and
values, mutual support, and ongoing commitment. Because of the fundamental and identity-defining
character of these bonds, sexual orientation is closely related to important personal identities .... ").
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individuals-in-relations characterization of groups, which begs the ques-
tion: should couples have aggregate moral rights? Extending the group
rights analogy suggests the answer is yes.
Moral recognition of same-sex couples is as important to sexual orien-
tation rights as moral recognition of groups is to cultural rights. Couples
ought to have aggregate moral rights because couples satisfy the three re-
quirements for group rights. First, couples can claim aggregate rights to
institutional conditions that protect their development. One such condition
is legal protection of couples' equal access to business establishments.
Second, this claim grows out of the human rights principle against sexual
orientation discrimination. Third, the critical mass component falls to the
wayside because the couples' rights that I propose in this Essay are rights
to nondiscrimination. The typical rights claim would involve same-sex
couples asking for access to existing goods and services that are tailored
for couples. The critical mass required for enjoying these products is two-
a number that same-sex couples satisfy by definition. This scenario differs
from the cases where a minority cultural group needs to amass a certain
number of people to make institutional conditions such as self-government
or second-language education feasible.
The analogy between moral recognition of groups and of couples is
compelling. In the cases of both groups and couples, recognizing the moral
rights of the collective entities produces results that cannot be achieved in
the individualist paradigm.72 Yet the analogy between ethnic groups' cul-
tural rights and couples' right to nondiscrimination is imperfect. In my
view, the aggregate right to nondiscrimination belonging to couples is, in
some regards, more appealing than ethnic minorities' aggregate cultural
rights. Specifically, the degree of tension between individual and group
rights does not transfer to the relationship between individual and couples'
rights.73 Some theorists fear that groups might invoke group rights to op-
press subgroups or individuals within the group. For example, a group
might invoke its culture as a defense to charges that it oppresses women.
While oppressive couples certainly exist,74 it is substantially easier to exit
an oppressive couple than an oppressive ethnic group.75 A no-fault divorce
is much easier to obtain than a change of ascriptive, physical characteris-
tics-characteristics that might lead people to identify an individual as an
72. See infra Part II.D for a discussion contrasting these disparate outcomes.
73. For background on the tension between group rights and individual rights, see KYMLICKA,
supra note 44, at 34-48; Jones, supra note 39, at 368-77.
74. For example, physical violence, psychological abuse, and patriarchal norms between partners
can all contribute to a couple's oppressiveness.
75. I recognize that there are significant hurdles to exiting an oppressive couple. These hurdles
are illustrated, for example, by the situations faced by many battered women. See Martha R. Mahoney,
Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 61-71
(1991) (describing battered women's decisions to stay in abusive relationships as a reasonable response
to the constraints on exit including the risk of assault that accompanies exit).
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ethnic minority, even if that individual did not so self-identify. Indeed, the
highly voluntary nature of coupledom mitigates the tension between group
and individual rights. 6 Some theorists also fear that dominant groups
might invoke group rights to oppress outside individuals and groups.
Again, this fear should not transfer to the context of couples. As collectives
of only two people, couples wield neither the size nor power that is likely
necessary to oppress people outside of the couple.77
Although couples' rights do not conflict with individual rights, they
sometimes conflict with group rights. For example, a group might argue
that, because same-sex relationships violate its religious beliefs, it should
be allowed to treat opposite-sex and same-sex couples differently. But to
the extent that couples' and group rights present competing interests, they
can be balanced in the fashion that competing individual and group rights
are already balanced. 78 Existing mechanisms for such balancing are dis-
cussed in Part III.B.3.
Notably, government protection of couples' right to intimacy does not
provide sufficient institutional conditions for couples to develop. Social
scientists have concluded that the "identity-defining" bonds between mem-
bers of a couple develop not only from sex, but also from "nonsexual
physical affection between partners, shared goals and values, mutual
support, and ongoing commitment. '79 These bonds are most often devel-
oped outside the confines of the bedroom. Thus, recognition of couples'
rights should extend into the public sphere."0
One might wonder where to draw the line between couples and other
types of associations. A failure to draw a line would stretch the right to
76. One might query whether the voluntary nature of coupledom undermines the need to protect
couples. I believe Thomas Pogge was correct when, in discussing group rights, he argued that "there
are strong reasons against ... making politically significant a distinction between inherited and chosen
cultural identities." Thomas G. Pogge, Group Rights and Ethnicity, in Shapiro & Kymlicka, supra, note
51, at 210-212.
77. Certainly, some couples oppress their children. However, such oppression does not stem from
the fact that the parents are coupled; single parents are often liable for oppressive parenting.
78. Consider the Supreme Court's balancing of groups' expressive rights and individuals' rights
to nondiscrimination in cases such as Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) and Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In Dale, the Boy Scouts' expressive rights trumped a
gay scoutmaster's right to nondiscrimination. In Roberts, the state's interest in protecting women from
discrimination trumped the Jaycees' expressive rights.
To the extent that existing balancing schemes are flawed, the goal should be to recalibrate the
scales (a project that I save for a future discussion). The tension between individual and group rights
does not necessitate the wholesale abandonment of either type of right. See Peter Rosenblum, Teaching
Human Rights: Ambivalent Activism, Multiple Discourses, and Lingering Dilemmas, 15 HARV. HUM.
RTs. J. 301, 306-08 (2002) (noting the tension between individual and group rights, but maintaining
that both types of rights are legitimate and that both should inform the development of human rights
law).
79. APA Brief, supra note 71, at 5.
80. Axel Honneth theorized that "dignity... [requires] social acceptance forthcoming for a
person's method of self-realization." Honneth, supra note 16, at 191. In that logic, membership in a
couple is a "method of self-realization" that warrants public recognition.
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self-development to an unwarranted extreme. Plenty of personal
associations influence people's self-development. Camaraderie with one's
softball teammates might be a formative component in one's self-
development. Should the team be afforded aggregate rights? Despite shar-
ing a superficial parallel, couples and other forms of association, such as
softball teams, are distinguishable by the second component of group
rights.81 Freedom from sexual orientation discrimination is an essential
element of an individual's human dignity. Conversely, membership in a
softball team, while it may shape an individual's sense of self, does not
implicate dignity in the way sexual identity does.82
Finally, I should reemphasize that I am arguing to have couples' rights
supplement-not supplant-individual and group rights. I envision a place
for all three types of rights in sexual orientation antidiscrimination law,
which would protect, for example, an individual lesbian's right to non dis-
crimination in employment, a couple's rights of equal access to public ac-
commodations, and a gay community's right to congregate in places such
as bars.83
C. Long-term Couples, Short-term Couples, Potential Couples
If we accept that couples deserve moral recognition as a collective
entity, how should the status of "couple" be defined? Should couples be
defined by a formal demarcation, for example a minimum time period of
dating or registration of some sort? Would Sandals' ban on same-sex cou-
ples have been less offensive to London Mayor Livingston if the company
made an exception for married same-sex couples? Can one justify
Michelangelo Signorile's criticism of eHarmony from a couples' rights
standpoint, considering that eHarmony is not discriminating against exist-
ing couples but just choosing what types of couples it brings together?
Where should the moral theorist draw the line?
In my view, taking sexual orientation justice seriously means recogni-
tion must be liberally shone upon not only long-term couples, but also
short-term couples, and even potential couples. The basis for my capacious
construal of coupledom is the fact that couples' moral rights derive from
the principle of self-development. One develops her sexual identity through
81. The second component dictates that group rights must share a nexus with individual human
rights claims. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
82. Five United Nations human rights treaty bodies have declared that protection from
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a human right. See Lau, supra note 6, at 1702 n.84
(collecting United Nations statements and opinions on sexual orientation discrimination). There have
been no similar statements regarding discrimination on the basis of membership in sports teams.
Likewise, moral philosophers have articulated a relationship between sexual orientation and human
dignity. See supra note 6.
83. In the early to mid-twentieth century, many states rescinded liquor licenses from bar owners
who allowed gays to congregate at their bars. On the regulation of gay bars, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 44-46, 78-80 (1999).
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her personal associations. Long-term relationships, short-term relation-
ships, and even relationships in the abstract significantly shape one's sex-
ual identity. Limiting moral recognition to long-term relationships also
seems objectionable because some queer theorists articulately challenge
conventional, monogamous, long-term relationships for being relics of re-
gressive heteronormativity1
4
In speaking of "short-term" couples, I am referring to couples that
have maintained a bond for only a short time span. It might be two people
who have dated for only two months, but want to escape to a Sandals ro-
mantic resort together. It might even be two people who pair up at ball-
room dancing lessons. They may be no more than dance partners for the
class; however, affirmation of their sexual orientation will still come into
play. To any given individual, dancing with a partner of one sex or another
might feel particularly natural or particularly awkward. Even when ball-
room dance partners are not sexual partners, the couple-oriented nature of a
ballroom dance can affirm--or suppress-the sexual identity of the dance
partners who become, even for a moment, a couple entitled to moral recog-
nition.8"
In speaking of "potential" couples, I am referring to entities implicat-
ing dating services such as eHarmony, which target romantically unat-
tached individuals with the business goal of creating (short- or long-term)
couples. In dating situations, individuals view themselves as one half of a
potential couple. eHarmony's clients, no less than the members of long-
and short-term couples, are individuals-in-relations because they affirm
their own-and each other's-sense of self by offering to serve as one an-
other's potential partners. Although the couple exists only in an abstract
sense, the individual's feeling of belonging to a potential couple still af-
firms her sense of identity. Accordingly, the individual has a claim to
moral recognition of that potential collective entity. As in the cases of
long-term and short-term couples, an individual constituent of a couple-in-
development can still put herself forth and speak for the potential collec-
tive.
When a dating service refuses to match same-sex couples, it is dis-
criminating between same-sex and opposite-sex couples by not recognizing
the validity of the former. To borrow language from constitutional juris-
prudence, the business is subjecting two types of potential entities (oppo-
site-sex couples and same-sex couples) to disparate treatment. The business
84. See, e.g., WARNER, supra note 36, at 41-80.
85. Cf Eric Marx, In the Ballroom, a Redefinition of "Couple, " NY TIMES, Jul, 14, 2004, at El
("[Ilf questions of gay identity and inclusion are being engaged in the workplace and in the bonds of
marriage, then why not in [a] professional and amateur sport [such as ballroom dance]?"); Wyatt
Buchanan, Ice Rink Settles Gay Discrimination Suit, S.F. CHRON., May 11, 2006, at B3 (reporting that




is not subjecting individuals to disparate treatment: as a formal matter,
individual gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals have equal access to the dating
service. However, such disparate treatment creates a disparate impact on
individuals of different sexual orientation (bisexual, gay, and straight).
Ultimately, because the disparate treatment is directed at a type of couple,
remedying the injustice requires shining recognition on that type of cou-
ple-even though it is a "potential" couple.
One can compare matchmaking services to educational institutions. At
first glance, the comparison appears to be a stretch, but closer examination
suggests that the analogy is worth some consideration. Matchmaking ser-
vices enable coupled identities while educational institutions enable group
identities. Refusing to teach a minority child how to read her native lan-
guage inflicts injury on the child even if she is merely beginning to learn
how to read. The child is only in the process of realizing her potential as a
member of a cultural collective, but the process of developing membership
is as worthy of recognition as the membership status itself. By enabling
one language and not another, an educational institution discriminates;
whether that discrimination is normatively justified will depend on the fea-
sibility of minority-language instruction. Similarly, by enabling one type of
coupled entity and not another, matchmaking services discriminate.
Non-recognition of potential couples can be as injurious as non-
recognition of short-term and long-term couples. Considering the historical
subordination of sexual minorities, the public might infer-correctly or
incorrectly-that a business refusing to match same-sex couples has cho-
sen to do so because same-sex couples are in some way inferior. It is pre-
cisely this false inferiority and consequent stigmatization that recognition
rights are supposed to ameliorate. Thus, recognition should be directed not
only at concrete couples, but also at couples-in-development.
D. From Moral Rights to Legal Rights
The law can be used to protect couples' aggregate moral rights. In this
Essay, I focus on one potential form of legal protection: laws that protect
couples' equal access to commercial establishments. Building on the group
rights analogy, couples' rights are rights to institutional conditions that pro-
tect couples' development. Nondiscrimination in commercial spaces is one
such institutional condition.
Discrimination against a couple can impede that couple's develop-
ment in at least two regards. First, discrimination is a deprivation of recog-
nition.86 Even if a business does not exclude two individuals severally,
those individuals suffer a wound when they are members of an excluded
86. Sexual minorities' right to recognition is a right to live visibly non-heterosexual lifestyles
while receiving recognition and approval of those lifestyles from other persons. On recognition rights,
see supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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type of couple. Exclusion suggests that the business refuses to recognize
the couple's legitimacy, striking a blow at the couple's collective dignity
and self-respect.8 7 Those dignitary harms burden the couple's development.
Second, exclusion deprives the couple of tangible goods and services that
might nurture the couple's development.
In the remainder of this Part, I show how laws in the individualist
paradigm under-protect couples' access to commercial establishments.
Accordingly, I sketch an alternative legal framework based on couples'
aggregate rights.
1. Existing Antidiscrimination Law: Why the Individualist Paradigm
Does Not Suffice
Construed in the individualist paradigm, antidiscrimination laws un-
der-protect couples. By using the term "individualist paradigm," I am
speaking of a paradigm in which rights are accorded only to individuals
and individuals are the analytical units among which differentiation is pro-
scribed by antidiscrimination laws. In this paradigm, couple-oriented busi-
nesses that maintain a heteronormative presumption do not discriminate
against sexual minorities because the businesses are not differentiating
among individuals."
87. On the dignitary harm of exclusion, see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (noting "the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of
equal access to public establishments.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Catriona McKinnon,
Exclusion Rules and Self-Respect, 34 J. VALUE INQUIRY 491, 491, 494-97 (2000) ("(T]he exclusion
from membership of some people by others prima facie damages opportunity for self-respect for the
excluded."). Although McKinnon discussed exclusion from social groups, one can apply her theorizing
to exclusionary policies more generally. On the notion of collective dignity, see Rhoda Howard,
Dignity, Community, and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 84
(Abdullahi An-Na'im ed., 1992) ("[H]uman dignity is not private, individual, or autonomous. It is
public, collective, and prescribed by social norms."); Law v. Canada, t2003] 1 S.C.R. 497, 53 (Can.)
("Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth.") (emphasis
added).
88. The limited-but growing--case law on this question is unhelpful. In one case, Rolon v.
Kulwitzky, 153 Cal. App. 3d 289 (Ct. App. 1984), a lesbian couple successfully brought a
discrimination claim against a restaurant that refused to seat same-sex couples in semi-private booths
reserved for couples. Unfortunately, the case's conclusory three-page opinion offers little analysis. By
explicitly adopting a theory of couples' rights, the court would have strengthened its seemingly
intuition-based opinion. In the contrasting case of Engel v. Worthington, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Ct. App.
1993), a photographer refused to photograph same-sex couples. In Engel, the court found sex
discrimination, but no sexual orientation discrimination. Id. The opinion was eventually withdrawn by
order of the court. Engel v. Worthington, No. S036051, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 558 (Cal. Feb. 3, 1994).
Finally, there is a pending California case in which same-sex couples are suing an adoption-related
business for refusing to post the couples' profiles on its website. Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, No. C
04-0135 PJH, 2005 WL 1513142 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2005) (establishing jurisdiction for the case).
The question at hand is not specific to the United States. At least one expert on European Union
law laments his belief the European Court of Justice will likely determine that discrimination against
same-sex couples does not constitute sexual orientation discrimination. See Bruce Carolan, Judicial




A lesbian woman could have stayed at a Sandals resort under the
company's former guest policy. The only condition was that she conform
to Sandals' heteronormative culture and bring along a male travel buddy.
Similarly, a gay man can access eHarmony's dating service, but he must
use the dating service to meet women. Thus, as a formal matter, these busi-
nesses are not differentiating between gay and straight individuals. They
are welcoming all individuals so long as each individual conforms to their
norms." This individual rights analysis appears unsatisfactory once one
realizes that, in the context of sexual orientation-which is necessarily re-
lational-the individual's identity cannot be disaggregated from the cou-
ple's identity.
The couples' rights paradigm can overcome this shortcoming. In the
couples' rights paradigm, rights are accorded to couples and couples are
analytical units among which differentiation is proscribed by antidiscrimi-
nation laws.9° Therefore, existing laws proscribing sexual orientation dis-
crimination would be interpreted to proscribe discrimination between
same-sex and opposite-sex couples, even absent discrimination among in-
dividuals. Some foreign courts have already adopted this rationale. Future
89. Contrast this scenario with cases in which businesses violated public accommodations laws
by saying "No Blacks"; in those cases, the blacks could not access the business establishments even if
they were willing to conform to white norms. See, e.g., Lewis v. Doll, 765 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1989) (finding a violation of a public accommodations law where a 7-11 clerk stated to a black
man: "No, we have a policy. Boss left strict orders not to serve any blacks .... I don't serve any
blacks."); Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 318 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (finding a violation of
a public accommodations law where a store owner told a black couple that he "did not want or need
nigger business"). Also, contrast the scenario with cases of sex discrimination, in which women could
not access a public accommodation no matter how masculine they acted. Cf Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (finding a violation of a public accommodations law where an
organization restricted membership based on sex but not gender).
90. Note that my definitions of individual and couples' rights focus on how rights are distributed
as opposed to how rights are exercised. While I argue that rights should be accorded to couples, an
individual should have standing to make arguments based on couples' rights. This formulation follows
from the notion that an individual can have standing to demand group rights, such as a right to
minority-language education for an ethnic minority group. Cf Will Kymlicka & Ian Shapiro,
Introduction, in Shapiro & Kymlicka, supra note 51, at 4 (discussing ethnic minorities' group rights,
opining that "[flocusing solely on whether the rights are exercised by individuals or groups misses what
is really at issue ... ").
91. For example, in finding that barring same-sex couples from marriage violated the Canadian
constitution, the Ontario Court of Appeal repeatedly appealed to "couples' equality rights." Halpem v.
Toronto, 172 O.A.C. 276 (2003). The reasoning in Halpern suggests the court used the term "couples'
equality rights" to refer to an aggregate right vested in the couple. The court stated that assessing the
existence of discrimination required a comparison not of individuals, but of same-sex and opposite-sex
couples. See id. at 65-72. It also stated that "[h]omosexual couples as well as homosexual
individuals have suffered greatly as a result of discrimination... homosexuals, whether as individuals
or couples, form an identifiable minority." Id. at 83 (quoting Egan v. Canada, [19951 2 S.C.R. 513,
184 (Can.) (Cory, J., dissenting). See also EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada, 182 B.C.A.C. 35, 133-35
(2003) (discussing "equality rights of same-sex couples" and citing Halpern with approval).
Similarly, in its landmark same-sex marriage case, the South African Constitutional Court stated
that discrimination is unacceptable regardless of whether it is directed at gays and lesbians "viewed as
individuals or in their same-sex relationships." Lesbian & Gay Equality Project v. Minister of Home
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laws should adopt the couples' rights paradigm by explicitly proscribing
discrimination among types of couples. The following Part introduces a
model law for doing so.
A strict proponent of individual rights who favors realism over for-
malism may advocate expanding the scope of individual rights rather than
supplementing them with couples' rights.92 For example, existing public
accommodations laws generally prohibit businesses from discriminating
against potential patrons by withholding access, thus creating a right of
access.93 A realist might propose that, instead of protecting couples' aggre-
gate right to access Sandals, existing laws should be reinterpreted to protect
individuals' meaningful access of Sandals. Put differently, the realist might
argue that public accommodations laws should protect substantive equality,
not formal equality.94
I believe that claims to substantive equality have strong moral force.
However, morally sound claims do not always map easily onto legal
rights.95 This is particularly true in the context of public accommodations
law. In legal practice, protecting an individual's meaningful access is prob-
lematic because "meaningful" is vague and subjective. If the law required
Affairs, [2005] (1) SA 04 (CC), 50 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/
gaylesb.htm (emphasis added). The court also invoked the "right to dignity of same-sex couples." Id. at
157.
92. Courts are sometimes extremely reluctant to take a realist approach to antidiscrimination law.
For example, the Supreme Court has twice held that pregnancy discrimination does not amount to sex
discrimination. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974). The Court recognized in Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 670, 676 (1983) that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1979)
overruled both General Electric Co. and Geduldig. At other times, courts take realist approaches by
invoking laws' underlying purposes. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Amer. v. AFL-CIO-CLC, 443
U.S. 193, 200-09 (1979) (upholding a race-conscious affirmative action plan against a reverse-
discrimination claim); id. at 208 (noting that "[tihe purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute
[Title VII]").
93. The mechanics of public accommodations laws are discussed in detail infra, at Part III.A.
94. While formal equality emphasizes equal opportunity, substantive equality emphasizes equal
outcomes. Under a substantive equality model, the law focuses not only on people's access to public
accommodations but also on what people get out of the access. Thus, the realist might argue for
guaranteeing substantive access rather than tweaking the existing formal-access approach to public
accommodations law. For background on the terms "formal equality" and "substantive equality," see
generally Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Appraisal,
74 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1696-98 (1986).
95. See Note, The Myth of Context in Politics and Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1292, 1306 (1997)
(arguing "it is unclear that substantive equality is ever fully achievable, to the extent that substantively
important factors about identity are beyond the scope of judges' perceptions .... [Substantive equality
is] in some sense beyond law's potentiality."). Due to the difficulty of realizing substantive equality
through legal decisions, courts often favor formal equality. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of
American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain
Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 33 (2000) (suggesting that the Supreme Court "has not reduced-and arguably
has invigorated-its enforcement of formal equality" because the principle is easy to apply); David S.
Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 1697, 1778 (2002) (explaining that judges generally prefer formal equality).
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Sandals to ensure that gay individuals' access to its resorts is meaningful, it
would be unclear whether allowing gay individuals to bring their same-sex
partners suffices. What if a resort's entertainment catered to the tastes of
the average straight couple? Would the resort need to provide entertain-
ment catered to the average gay couple as well? These questions are diffi-
cult to answer because it is difficult to discern what is substantively
meaningful to individual customers. Looking beyond examples involving
gay patrons, consider the difficulty in determining a man's meaningful ac-
cess to the bra retailer.
To the extent that an individual's "meaningful access" means "access
with my chosen partner," formal equality among couples fosters substan-
tive equality among individuals. In that regard, the couples' rights para-
digm realizes benefits of both formal and substantive approaches to
justice: the couples' rights paradigm furthers substantive equality while
preserving the legal clarity of formalism.96
The most persuasive argument for protecting couples' rights through
the existing individualist framework of antidiscrimination law is the argu-
ment that businesses discriminating against a type of couple are essentially
discriminating against the individual members of that couple on the basis
of their sex.97 Framing couples' rights as sex discrimination may appear
particularly attractive because sex discrimination is already proscribed by
most states' public accommodations statutes.98  Indeed, the sex-
discrimination rationale was adopted by a California court in the unpub-
lished-and ultimately withdrawn-opinion of Engel v. Worthington, a
case in which a commercial photographer refused to photograph same-sex
96. See Conkle, supra note 95, at 33 (praising formal equality for being a principle that "is
conducive to relatively clear-cut exposition and application.").
97. For example, one could argue that the only reason a woman could not have gone to Sandals
with another woman is because she is a woman, i.e., because of her sex. For more information on how
sexual orientation discrimination is framed as sex discrimination, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY
RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 53-71 (2002) [hereinafter KOPPLEMAN, THE
GAY RIGHTS QUESTION]; Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) [hereinafter Koppelman, Discrimination]. Framing
discrimination against same-sex couples as sex discrimination is, in large part, a product of analogizing
same-sex couples to mixed-race couples. See Stephen Clark, Same-Sex but Equal: Reformulating the
Miscegenation Analogy, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 107, 107-15 (2002) (providing background on the
miscegenation analogy); DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir.
1979) (discussing and rejecting appellants argument that because "the EEOC has held that
discrimination against an employee because of the race of the employee's friends may constitute
discrimination based on race... analogously discrimination because of the sex of the employees'
sexual partner should constitute discrimination based on sex.").
98. See Paula J. Finlay, Note, Prying Open the Clubhouse Door: Defining the "Distinctly
Private" Club after New York State Club Association v. City of New York, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 383
(1990) (noting that forty states and the District of Columbia have banned sex discrimination in public
accommodations).
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couples.99 The court dismissed the plaintiffs sexual orientation argument
and reached its decision based on sex discrimination, even though
California case law also prohibits public accommodation discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation.00
The sex discrimination argument is, however, an unsatisfactory substi-
tute for the couples' rights paradigm, on both practical and normative
fronts. From a practical standpoint, the sex discrimination argument is un-
satisfactory because its reception by courts has been lukewarm at best. 1 '
From a normative standpoint, the sex discrimination argument does not
shine due recognition on the couple qua couple. Commentators have ex-
pressed their discomfort in shrouding sexual orientation discrimination in
terms of sex discrimination. 2 Although the legal outcome may be func-
tionally equivalent, by not recognizing sexual orientation discrimination as
99. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Ct. App. 1993). The Engel opinion was eventually withdrawn by order
of the court. Engel v. Worthington, No. S036051, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 558 (Feb. 3, 1994) (denying review
and withdrawing the opinion by order of the court).
100. Sexual orientation is not specifically addressed in the California public accommodations law.
Unruh Civil Rights Act. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 51 (West 2005). However, California courts have
construed the Act to include sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for discrimination. See Hubert v.
Williams, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1982) (holding that discrimination based on sexual
orientation is a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act).
101. The sex discrimination argument has produced mixed results in same-sex marriage cases. For
example, in the Vermont case of Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880-81 n.13 (Vt. 1999), the majority
stated, "[W]e are not persuaded that sex discrimination offers a useful analytic framework .. "
However, in her separate opinion, Justice Johnson adopted the sex discrimination argument. See id. at
904-05 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I write separately to state my belief that
this is a case of straightforward sex discrimination."). In the Massachusetts case of Goodridge v. Dep "t
of Public Health, Justice Greaney endorsed the sex discrimination argument in his concurring opinion.
798 N.E.2d 941, 971 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J., concurring). However, in the same case, three other
justices rejected the sex discrimination argument. Id. at 992 (Cordy, J., dissenting, with whom Spina
and Sossman, JJ., joined). For other examples of the sex discrimination argument being endorsed in the
same-sex marriage context, see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (decision rendered moot by
amendment to Hawaii's Constitution, art. I, §23); Coordination Proceeding, Special Title, Marriage
Cases, 2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Sup. Mar. 14, 2005). See also Clark, supra note 97, at 109-10
("Litigants, commentators, and even judges have debated the merits of this sex discrimination argument
and its underlying miscegenation analogy as applied to same-sex marriage exclusions, same-sex
sodomy laws, and antigay employment discrimination. This sex discrimination argument has
sometimes prevailed ... but more often it has failed.").
For a description of the relationship between sex and sexual orientation in Title VII discrimination
cases, see Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Holds That Male Coworkers' and Supervisor's Harassment of
Male Employee for Failing to Meet Sex Stereotype Constitutes Sex Discrimination, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2074, 2074-75 (2002) (noting that "[i]t is a common refrain in Title VII jurisprudence that the statutory
prohibition on 'discrimina[tion] ... because of... sex' does not extend to discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation," but noting exceptions involving same-sex sexual harassment).
102. See, e.g., Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay
Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 498, 503 (2001); John Gardner, On the Ground of Her Sex(uality), 18
OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 167, 183 (1998); Danielle Kie Hart, Same-sex Marriage Revisited: Taking a




such, the moral recognition of sexual minorities becomes the marginalized
stepchild of sex discrimination principles. 1
03
In contrast to the sex discrimination framework, the couples' rights
framework recognizes couples by focusing its inquiry on comparing types
of relationships. The inquiry emphasizes "same" and "different" in "same-
sex versus opposite-sex," as opposed to emphasizing "sex." Surely, even in
the couples' rights paradigm one needs to ascertain the sex of partners to
describe the couples whose rights are at stake, but that sex-based inquiry is
not the final question; it is a step in a larger comparison of relationship
types. °
4
2. An Insufficient Alternative to Couples' Rights: Expanding Individual
Freedoms of Expression and Intimate Association
One who is reluctant to depart from the individualist paradigm might
attempt to reframe a couple's aggregate right to nondiscrimination as rights
to expression and intimate association vested in each member of the cou-
ple. But like expanding formal rights of access to substantive rights of ac-
cess, such refraining raises concerns.
a. Constitutional Claims
One might argue that a couple's right to access business establish-
ments can be framed as an individual's right to freedom of expression.
Under this logic, a federal court in Rhode Island invoked freedom of ex-
pression to protect a high school student's right to bring his same-sex date
to his public high school's prom.' °5 In that landmark case, the court found
that bringing a same-sex partner to the prom constituted political expres-
sion." However, individuals usually cannot make constitutional claims
against business establishments because business practices generally lack a
nexus with state action.'0 7 Business owners currently have the right to
103. 1 do not mean to deny the links between anti-gay sentiments and support for traditional
gender roles. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Multivocal Prejudices and Homo Equality, 74 IND. L.J.
1085, 1110 (1999) (describing those links). However, I believe that remedying sexual orientation
discrimination requires putting sexual orientation discrimination front and center.
104. For more on how shifting from the individualist paradigm to the couples' rights paradigm
shifts the inquiry from sex to sexual orientation, see infra Conclusion (discussing the shifts in the
context of marriage law).
105. Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D. R.I. 1980).
106. Id.
107. The state action doctrine dictates that the First Amendment only protects against infringement
of free expression when the government is responsible for the infringement. See, e.g., Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) (rejecting a free speech claim against a private shopping mall due
to a lack of state action). The Court first announced the state action doctrine in the Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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restrict expressive freedoms-of their employees and of their clientele-
through means such as dress codes and bans on foreign languages." 8
Similarly, one might argue that individuals have existing rights to ac-
cess couple-oriented businesses with partners of their choosing because the
Constitution protects freedom of intimate association.0 9 However, this ar-
gument lacks support because freedom of intimate association is generally
construed as protecting decisions relating solely to domesticity and, like
freedom of expression, the constitutionally protected freedom of intimate
association is confined to instances involving state action."'
Notably, couples' inability to invoke the Constitution to protect access
to business establishments does not directly point to the inadequacy of our
Constitution's individual rights framework, but rather to the presently lim-
ited reach of those rights as they are interpreted in case law. Unless jurists
are ready to radically expand the Constitution's reach, these limitations
heighten the need to consider statutory solutions that could reach business
establishments. One way to protect couples' access to these businesses,
without departing from the individualist paradigm, is to increase legislative
protections of free expression and intimate association in commercial con-
texts that do not involve state action.
b. Statutory Claims
Statute-based antidiscrimination law currently offers individuals some
protection against restrictions on identity expression. However, it generally
only protects against group-specific restrictions, such as restrictions on
women (but not men) expressing masculinity."' In the employment
108. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding an office's English-only
policy); Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding an
employer's restriction on braided hairstyles).
109. On intimate association, see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 619 (stating that
the freedom of intimate association protected by the Constitution extends to a small set
of relationships: "those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family-marriage...
childbirth ... the raising and education of children ... and cohabitation with one's relatives").
110. See Paul M. Secunda, Lawrence's Quintessential Millian Moment and Its Impact on the
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 50 VILL. L. REV. 117, 146 (2005) (asserting that "Lawrence
recognize[d] an important limitation on the rights to... intimate association in certain... public
circumstances"); Morris B. Kaplan, Constructing Lesbian and Gay Rights and Liberation, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1877, 1901 (1993) ("The freedom of intimate association ... emphasizes the creation of intimate
spaces .... These intimate spaces are traditionally and metaphorically represented in terms of the
home. Domesticity is the space of intimacy.").
111. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (holding that restrictions on
women behaving masculinely violated Title VII); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex
Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 177-87 (2004) (discussing the
neutrality principle in Hopkins and its progeny). There have been some exceptions to the principle of
requiring neutrality between groups. See Yuracko, supra at 187 (noting exceptional cases involving
male cross-dressing); Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., No. 03-15045, 2006 WL 962533, at *5
(9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2006) ("We have long recognized that companies may differentiate between men and
women in appearance and grooming policies, and so have other circuits."). In an individualist analysis,
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context, disparate impact claims can be raised, but are rarely successful.
Courts will validate restrictions on identity expression, even if such restric-
tions disparately burden particular individuals, so long as the expression is
of a mutable trait."' In public accommodations litigation, disparate impact
claims are generally not allowed at all." 3
In the employment law context, commentators have suggested that
statutes be reinterpreted or amended to protect individuals' rights to exer-
cise mutable forms of expression that are integral to those individuals'
sense of belonging to protected identity groups."4 For example, Paulette
Caldwell argues that African-American individuals should have a statutory
right to challenge office grooming codes banning braided hairstyles be-
cause wearing braids is a type of expression that is potentially integral to
one's sense of membership in the African-American community.' Others
argue for statutes to prohibit office rules requiring employees to speak
English even during breaks because speaking a foreign language is a form
of expression that is potentially integral to one's membership in an ethnic
minority group.16
Although these proposals focus on broadening statute-based proscrip-
tions of discrimination in employment law, their logic can be extended to
the context of sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations.
If one's choice in partner is an expression of her sexual orientation, then
bringing that partner to a Sandals resort is like wearing braids or speaking a
foreign language; it is simply the expression of a trait-one that is arguably
integral to membership in the lesbian community-and therefore entitled to
legal protection. In this fashion, couples' rights to access public accommo-
dations can be framed as individual rights to make expressive traits visible.
restrictions on same-sex coupling are not group-specific because all individuals are equally barred from
same-sex coupling, regardless of sex, race, sexual orientation, or any other status.
112. See generally Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623,
656-57 (2005) (providing background on disparate impact claims involving mutable traits and
collecting sources).
113. See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 892 (Cal. 1991) (rejecting a
disparate impact argument, noting "plaintiffs have cited no case (nor has our research disclosed any) in
which a disparate impact test was used in applying any [state or federal public accommodations]
statutes."). But see Robinson v. Power Pizza, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 1462, 1465 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (applying
disparate impact theory to a Title II public accommodations case).
114. See Yuracko, supra note I l, at 207-16 (summarizing and critiquing literature that endorses
the protection of group-identity traits). Kenji Yoshino might go one step further by suggesting that
performing an act can be constitutive of group status even if the act lacked expressive functions. Thus,
the expanded legal protections should focus on performance as opposed to expressiveness. See
Yoshino, supra note 23, at 865-73 (developing Yoshino's "weak performative model" of identity).
115. See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 369 (1991) (suggesting that black women's braids are "[a] positive
expression of ethnic pride" warranting statutory protection).
116. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin"
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 808 (1994) (arguing for an expansion of
Title VII to protect language rights and other expressions of ethnicity).
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However, the above proposals have been subject to criticism because
determining which expressive traits-if any-are integral to one's mem-
bership in an identity group is a daunting practice.' 17 The proposals would
leave courts assessing questions such as whether braids are really constitu-
tive of membership in the African-American community and whether the
Spanish language is really integral to Latino identity. Should courts be left
to determine what is integral to group identities and, thus, worthy of pro-
tection? The very nature of these inquiries risks judicial essentialization of
protected groups.'8
In contrast, the couples' rights paradigm protects couples while avoid-
ing the similarly essentialist question: which expressive traits are integral
to membership in a sexual minority group such as the gay community? The
paradigm avoids the essentialist inquiry because the couple is not only an
expressive trait of belonging to a larger identity group, but also an identity
"group" itself that warrants protection. In the couples' rights paradigm, a
ban on a particular type of couple is equivalent to explicit bans on particu-
lar racial or religious groups, as opposed to bans on particular racial or re-
ligious traits.
In treating couples as collective entities, the couples' rights paradigm
addresses situations in which members of same-sex couples do not con-
sider their coupledom a trait expressive of belonging to a larger gay or bi-
sexual community. As noted above, membership in a couple informs one's
sense of sexual orientation, even when that individual feels no allegiance to
a larger identity group. For example, a woman who is attracted to both men
and women might not connect with the group label "bisexual," but may
still feel that her current same-sex relationship affirms her sense of sexual
orientation. Or, the woman may embrace pomosexuality,' eschewing
group categories such as "gay," "lesbian," "straight," and "bisexual." Even
if the woman identifies with a relatively obscure label such as
"heterosexual-leaning bisexual," she might refuse to characterize her
membership in a same-sex couple as an expression of bisexuality.12 ° She
117. For elaboration of this critique, see Yuracko, supra note 11, at 214-16; Roberto J. Gonzalez,
Note, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement in Disparate Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 2195, 2207-14 (2003).
118. Essentialism-the assigning of essential traits to identity groups--overlooks diversity within
identity groups and fosters stereotyping. See, e.g., Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585-90 (1990) (criticizing racial essentialism and gender
essentialism).
119. On pomosexuality, which is short for "postmodem sexuality," see POMOSEXUALS:
CHALLENGING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT GENDER AND SEXUALITY (Carol Queen & Lawrence Schimel
eds., 1997); Mitchel Raphael, Where Gay Goes after the Mainstream, TORONTO STAR, May 17, 1998,
at B6 ("In a pomosexual world, sexual categories are no longer rigid. People can move beyond labels-
gay, lesbian, bisexual, transsexual .... ").
120. Membership in the same-sex couple likely miscommunicates to most people that the
hypothetical woman is lesbian and not bisexual. As a descriptive matter, bisexuality often fails to be
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might reject any suggestion that her romantic Sandals getaway is meant to
express anything more than a desire for rest and relaxation. The woman
and her partner want Sandals to recognize their union, not because it ex-
presses membership in a gay or bisexual community, but because the union
is a collective entity that is important in and of itself. Thus, it would be dis-
ingenuous to say that the woman has a right to bring her partner to
Sandals because the partner is an expressive trait.
Similarly, one may advocate using statutory law to protect individu-
als' freedom of intimate association in contexts outside of state action.
However, even if this freedom is extended beyond the context of state ac-
tion, it will still under-protect couples. Freedom of intimate association is
generally understood as a liberty to make decisions that "attend the
creation and sustenance of a family.""'' Classic examples of the freedom of
intimate association include the liberty to make decisions regarding cohabi-
tation and child custody.'22 Accordingly, extending the freedom of intimate
association to the commercial context should protect same-sex couples'
right to access businesses, such as adoption-relation services, which relate
to the creation and sustenance of a family.'23 However, it would be a
stretch to say that any two same-sex dance partners have an intimate-
association interest in the creation and sustenance of a family. Dancing
together-or even vacationing together-is not likely to be closely related
to the shaping of one's family, while cohabitation and child custody are.
However, even when individuals in a couple do not have a liberty claim
that qualifies as an intimate association claim, that couple should be per-
mitted to invoke an aggregate right to nondiscrimination.'24
acknowledged by other sexual minorities and by the heterosexual majority. On this point, see generally
Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000).
121. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 619. For concise summaries of the Court's
definition of intimate association see Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party
Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 818 n.235 (2001); Michael Kavey, Note, Private Voucher Schools
and the First Amendment Right to Discriminate, 113 YALE L.J. 743, 758 n.77 (2003). See also Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that sexual intimacy
implicates freedom of intimate association because sexual intimacy is, inter alia, "central to family
life"). For the article that first articulated a theory of intimate association, see Kenneth L. Karst, The
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
122. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 619 (listing "the raising and education of
children.. . and cohabitation with one's relatives" as examples of intimate association right); Karst,
supra note 121, at 630-31 (stating "[t]he idea of a freedom of intimate association thus includes a
couple's claim of the right to choose to live together.., but it also includes a divorced mother's claim
of a right to access to her child who is in the custody of her former husband...").
123. In a California case, same-sex couples are currently challenging their exclusion from an
adoption-related business. See Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, No. C 04-0135 PJH, 2005 WL 1513142
(N.D. Cal. June 21, 2005) (establishing jurisdiction for the case).
124. Alternatively, an individual might seek to make a hybrid argument based on EEOC decisions
that prohibit employers from discriminating against employees based on the race of their friends.
Notably however, in the individualist paradigm, the analog hybrid claim is based on sex (not sexual
orientation) discrimination, i.e., the claim is that businesses should not discriminate against patrons
based on the sex of their partner. Cf DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327,
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When businesses exclude couples, that exclusion compromises indi-
viduals' liberty interests as well as couples' equality interests. For example,
Sandals' exclusion of same-sex couples inflicted a liberty-based wound
because it limited people's power to choose their vacation partners and
their ability to make expressive traits visible. Sandals also inflicted an
equality-based wound by singling out certain couples for deprivation and
undercutting their dignity.'2 5 Couples should be allowed to articulate both
types of wounds. Moreover, couples should be allowed to invoke aggregate
rights to remedy the equality-based wound.
III
TOWARDS A MODEL PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAW
Thus far, I have argued that public accommodations laws should pro-
scribe discrimination against collective entities, as opposed to simply pro-
scribing discrimination against individuals. In this Part, I elaborate on that
argument by proposing a model public accommodations law and explain-
ing the mechanics related to its enforcement.
As mentioned above, I focus on public accommodations laws because
a considerable number of jurisdictions already prohibit public accommoda-
tions from discriminating on the basis of "sexual orientation."' 2 6 However,
despite having the potential to protect same-sex couples, public accommo-
dations laws generally have not yet done so.' 27 This Part proposes ways to
fulfill that potential.
In Part III.A, I provide background on public accommodations laws
generally and then propose four elements to a model law: (1) a broad defi-
nition of "public accommodations," (2) a proscription of sexual orientation
discrimination, (3) a specification that distinctions between same-sex and
opposite-sex couples constitute per se sexual orientation discrimination,
and (4) a provision exempting businesses that satisfy certain criteria dis-
cussed below. Although I frame this subsection as a legislative proposal, it
can also be read as an interpretation and enforcement guide for existing
statutes. Some states' public accommodations laws already embody the
first, second, and fourth elements of the proposed law. In those states,
courts can give life to the third element by adopting a couples' rights ap-
proach to interpreting the term "sexual orientation" in their existing laws.
331 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussing and rejecting appellants' argument that because "the EEOC has held
that discrimination against an employee because of the race of the employee's friends may constitute
discrimination based on race.., analogously discrimination because of the sex of the employees'
sexual partner should constitute discrimination based on sex"). See also Karst, supra note 121, at 659-
64 (suggesting that intimate association claims can be anchored in equal protection doctrine).
125. On the dignitary harms of exclusion, see supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 29.
127. For a discussion of the limited and inconsistent litigation under existing public
accommodation laws, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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In Part III.B, I elaborate on some of the key terms that are relevant to the
proposed law.
A. Integrating Couples' Rights and Public Accommodations Law
1. Background on Public Accommodations Laws
There are currently two federal public accommodations laws: Title II
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act12 and Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.2 9 At the same time, most states and local jurisdictions
have their own public accommodations laws. These regulations generally
create a right of equal access to public accommodations. 3 ' The most ex-
pansive laws include business establishments within the definition of
"public accommodations." 131
Public accommodations laws regulating businesses require such estab-
lishments to refrain from discriminating against potential patrons on speci-
fied bases such as race, sex, disability status, and sexual orientation.
Although public accommodations laws usually only require businesses to
passively refrain from discriminatory conduct, they sometimes require
businesses to actively remedy institutionalized discriminatory practices.
For example, a railroad company could be ordered to remove signs prohib-
iting racial minorities from accessing certain cars. Similarly, a shopping
mall might be enjoined to create wheelchair ramps for remedying unequal
access between patrons in wheelchairs and patrons on foot.
Because public accommodations laws generally stop at access,132
business establishments have no duty to alter their products or services to
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000) [hereinafter ADA].
130. See Lauren J. Rosenblum, Note, Equal Access or Free Speech: The Constitutionality of
Public Accommodation Laws, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1243, 1243 (1997) (explaining that "[t]he public
accommodations statutes of most states and many municipalities ... were enacted to ensure that all
members of society have equal access to goods and services") (emphasis added).
The public accommodations provision in the 1964 Civil Rights Act uses the term "equal
enjoyment" as well as "equal access." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000) ("Equal Access. All persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation .... ). However, the Supreme Court has
conflated the terms, essentially defining enjoyment as access. See Daniel J. Trainor, Comment, Native
American Mascots, Schools, and the Title VI Hostile Environment Analysis, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 971,
998 ("The Supreme Court has interpreted 'enjoyment' in [Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] to
mean access, not personal fulfillment or joy."). See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250 (1964)
(noting that the "fundamental object of Title VII was to vindicate 'the deprivation of personal dignity
that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments"') (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted), and quoted in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 625.
A notable outlier is the ADA, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, (1990), codified at 42 U.S.C. §
12182(a) (2000). Courts have found that the ADA's public accommodations provision protects more
than access. This exception will be discussed infra, at notes 182-187 and accompanying text.
131. See discussion infra, at notes 141-142 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 130 (noting the ADA as an exception); see also infra, at notes 182-187 and
accompanying text.
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ensure that patrons derive equal utility from accessed goods and services. 13
A retailer can sell women's clothing while maintaining no obligation to sell
men's clothes. That retailer, however, may not restrict men from entering
the store and purchasing women's clothing, even if men generally find lit-
tle utility in women's clothing. Indeed, businesses may specialize their
products but may not restrict access to products just because they are spe-
cialized. The question of whether to purchase a specialized product is a
decision left to the consumer. Choosing not to purchase a useless product
is, to some degree, an act of empowerment. The customer is exercising her
freedom of autonomous decision-making. Meanwhile, being excluded from
that decision-making process can be debilitating. The excluded party is left
to question why she was excluded. Was she adjudged to be inferior?
Misrecognized? Unrecognized?
Various examples illustrate this dynamic between specialized prod-
ucts and customer choice. For instance, a law office can specialize in repre-
senting women in divorce cases. However, the law office, as a public
accommodation, cannot discriminate against potential male clients.'34 It
must ultimately be the customer who decides whether the product is right
for him. Similarly, a bar may market its "Ladies' Night," but may neither
entirely prohibit men from attending, 35 nor charge lower prices of admis-
sion for women, rendering men's access to the bar unequal.'36 A beautician
can market himself as a specialist in braiding African-American hair, but
may not hang a "Blacks Only" sign in his window.
133. See, e.g., Stearnes v. Baur's Opera House, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 375, 378 (C.D. Il1. 1992)
(holding that a dance club did not violate the public accommodations provision of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act when it refused to play music that black patrons enjoyed), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 3 F.3d
1142 (7th Cir. 1993); Phillips v. Interstate Hotels Corp., 974 S.W.2d 680 (Tenn. 1998) (stating that a
hotel did not violate Tennessee's public accommodations laws by playing music that deterred black
patronage). See also supra note 130 (noting the conflation of "access" and "enjoyment" in
jurisprudence on the public accommodations provision).
134. See, e.g., Stropinsky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. 39 (M.C.A.D. 1997) (finding that a law firm
specializing in representing women in divorce cases violated Massachusetts's antidiscrimination law by
refusing to represent a man).
135. See, e.g., Easebe Enters., Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 190 Cal. Rptr. 678
(Ct. App. 1983) (revoking a liquor license from Chippendales, a cabaret bar featuring semi-nude male
dancers, because it violated California's public accommodations law by refusing to permit male
customers from entering its premises during the dance performances).
136. Out of the nine states that have addressed sex-based discounts, six held that the discounts
were per se violations of public accommodations laws. See Gillespie v. J.C.B.C., Inc., No. CRT 2579-
03, 2004 WL 1476932, at *1 (N.J. Office Admin. L. June 10, 2004); Ladd v. Iowa West Racing Ass'n,
438 N.W.2d 600 (Iowa 1989); City of Clearwater v. Studebaker's Dance Club, 516 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 506 A.2d 263 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986);
Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195 (Cal. 1985); Penn. Liquor Control Bd. v. Dobrinoff, 471 A.2d
941 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984). The three remaining states held that sex-based discounts do not violate
public accommodations laws when their purpose is to increase overall patronage. See Dock Club, Inc.
v. I11. Liquor Control Comm'n, 428 N.E.2d 735 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); MacLean v. First Northwest Indus.




With all of that said, the right of access created by public accommoda-
tions laws is not absolute. Although public accommodations regulations
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, they generally excuse business estab-
lishments under a lisnited set of circumstances, which have been referred to
as circumstances involving a bona fide business interest.137 Courts have
narrowly construed these exceptions. Catering to customer preferences to
avoid losing business is not itself a bona fide business interest. 138 However,
customer preference does create a bona fide business interest when it is
rooted in liberty interests such as privacy, health, or safety. For example,
restrooms and locker rooms have generally been exempt from public ac-
commodations laws.'39 The purported reasoning is that sex segregation in
these contexts protects a privacy interest and thus is part of a legitimate
business interest. 4 ' Although privacy is the liberty interest most often in-
voked to exempt businesses from public accommodations laws, some states
have also created exceptions for businesses that discriminate when that
discrimination protects patrons' health or safety.14" ' Additional
137. See Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1335, 1365-66 (1997) (noting ubiquity Sof the "bona fide qualification" in state public
accommodations laws).
138. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 260 (stating that potential economic loss suffered by
public accommodations did not render the Civil Rights Act of 1964 unconstitutional); LivingWell
(North) Inc. v. Penn. Human Relations Comm'n, 606 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Pa. Commnw. Ct. 1992)
(asserting that an exemption is "not normally warranted in a situation involving customer preference").
Consider the analogous situation in employment discrimination cases, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that consumer preferences did not justify the
maintenance of an all-female flight attendant staff).
139. See, e.g., LivingWell, 606 A.2d at 1289, 1291:
[An exemption is] not normally warranted in a situation involving customer preference unless
associated with recognized privacy rights .... [W]here there is a distinctly private activity
involving exposure of intimate body parts, there exists an implied bona fide public
accommodation qualification which may justify otherwise illegal sex discrimination.
Otherwise, as the Commission notes, such sex segregated accommodations such as
bathrooms, showers and locker rooms, would have to be open to the public.
See also Volokh, supra note 137, at 1365 n.95 (listing examples of privacy-based exemptions in
different states). In some jurisdictions the privacy rationale has been extended to exempt single-sex
fitness clubs from public accommodations laws. See MASS. G N. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West
2000) (exempting fitness clubs in Massachusetts); Miriam A. Cherry, Exercising the Right to Public
Accommodations: The Debate over Single-Sex Health Clubs, 52 ME. L. REV. 97, 99 (2000) (describing
the history of the Massachusetts law; noting that it was supported by privacy-based arguments). See
also LivingWell, 606 A.2d at 1294 (accepting the privacy argument asserted by an all-female fitness
club in Pennsylvania and refusing to order the club to admit men because "no reasonable alternative
exists to protect LivingWell's customer's privacy interests while at the same time accommodating male
members").
140. See supra note 139.
141. On health-based exceptions, see Karen H. Rothenberg, Gender Matters: Implications for
Clinical Research and Women's Health Care. 32 Hous. L. REV. 1201, 1256-58 (1996) (discussing a
narrowly defined exception in some public accommodations laws that allows medical service providers
to distinguish between sexes). On safety, see, e.g., Lewis v. Doll, 765 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Wash. Ct. App.
1989). The court noted that Washington law permits public accommodations to discriminate among
patrons when doing so prevents "risk to property or other persons." See id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
§ 49.60.215 (2002)).
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exceptions exist in the context of disabilities law; however, this Essay later
distinguishes the disabilities context from the rest of public accommoda-
tions jurisprudence. 142
Notably, privacy-based exemptions should not carry over to the sexual
orientation context. Indeed, an impetus for this Essay is to bring same-sex
relationships into the public sphere; allowing businesses to discriminate
against sexual orientation through a privacy exemption would undermine
that process. Overt sexual activity between members of couples (regardless
of their sexual orientation) might be deemed inappropriate for the public
sphere; however, such conduct is already regulated by laws prohibiting
public nudity and lewdness. As a general matter, barring access to public
accommodations based on sexual orientation is unnecessary to preserve the
private nature of sexual activity.143
2. Public accommodations and sexual orientation: a proposed framework
To protect against sexual orientation discrimination, this Essay pro-
poses four elements for a model public accommodations statute:
1) The law should broadly define "public accommodations"
to include all business establishments, including sellers of
retail goods and services.
2) The law should protect equal access to public
accommodations by prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of "sexual orientation."
3) Distinctions between opposite-sex and same-sex couples
should constitute per se discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. "A
4) The law should create a narrowly defined exception for
businesses that invoke a bona fide business interest. 145
142. The ADA qualifies its public accommodations provision by exempting cases in which
compliance would expose the public accommodation to "undue burden" or would otherwise
"fundamentally alter" the public accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2000). These exemptions
require fact-intensive, case-by-case assessments. Compare Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp 1242
(D. Or. 1998) (finding that permitting a disabled professional golfer to use a golf cart instead of
walking during a tournament did not fundamentally alter the nature of the tournament), affd 204 F.3d
994 (9th Cir. 2000) and 532 U.S. 661 (2001), with Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo.
1996) (finding that permitting a family member on the ice to direct moves for a player with Attention
Deficit Disorder would fundamentally alter the hockey league's game). Though the ADA's underlying
principles offer guidance in proposing a model public accommodations law for the sexual orientation
context, the Act must ultimately be distinguished as being inapposite because courts have construed it
as protecting more than just access. See infra notes 182-187 and accompanying text.
143. One exception is when the nature of a business establishment requires couples to interact on a
physical level, for example, in cases involving square dancing. These exceptional cases will be
discussed infra, at Part III.B.2.
144. For a discussion on why the proposed law focuses on discrimination between types of
couples as opposed to discrimination between couples and polyamorous unions, see supra note 64.
145. This exception will be explored in greater detail infra, at Part III.B.2.
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The first, second, and fourth elements are not entirely novel. With
respect to the first element, some state public accommodations laws al-
ready broadly construe "public accommodations" to include all business
establishments. For example, California's public accommodations statute
expressly states that "all business establishments" are considered public
accommodations. 146 Likewise, New Jersey's law extends to any "retail
shop, store, establishment, or concession dealing with goods or services of
any kind." 147
Laws did not always broadly construe public accommodations. His-
torically, common law public accommodations rights were travelers'
rights. 148 Old English law required establishments such as inns and saloons
to accommodate potential guests in order to ensure that travelers had basic
living needs met. 149 In the post-Civil War era, however, public accommo-
dations laws took on a new meaning. Civil rights advocates saw a relation-
ship between discrimination in public accommodations and cultural
citizenship, 5° and subscription to this conceptualization of public accom-
modations law grew during the mid-twentieth century's civil rights move-
ment.15' Over time, denying access to a public accommodation has come to
be viewed as a form of oppression. In response, many jurisdictions are de-
fining "public accommodations" more broadly to further principles of
equality. This Essay advocates a broad definition of public accommoda-
tions because only such a definition will adequately achieve the goal dis-
cussed in Part I-protecting sexual minorities' recognition rights in the
public sphere. 5 '
The second element is also not novel. Fifteen states already have pub-
lic accommodations laws that proscribe discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation,'53 and that number will likely rise. As of December 2005,
seven additional state legislatures are considering antidiscrimination bills
146. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5 1(b) (West 2005).
147. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (West 2002).
148. For a history of public accommodations regulations at common law, see Joseph William
Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283,
1303-20 (1996).
149. See id. at 1304-05.
150. On cultural citizenship, see supra note 34.
151. See Hunter, supra note 34, at 1617-24.
152. One should note that most public accommodations laws maintain an exception to the
definition of "public accommodations" for private clubs. See generally Jay M. Zitter, What Constitutes
Private Club or Association Not Otherwise Open to Public that is Exempt from State Civil Rights
Statute, 83 A.L.R.5th 467 (2004). This Essay does not propose abrogating that exception. However,
even private clubs can be deemed public accommodations if their membership and activities are
substantially public in nature. Id.
153. See supra note 29.
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that will protect against sexual orientation discrimination in public accom-
modations. 154
As discussed above, the fourth element is well established in public
accommodations law. Lawmakers have traditionally limited the reach of
public accommodations laws by creating exceptions for bona fide business
interests. Part III.B explores in more detail how such exceptions should be
defined in the context of sexual orientation discrimination.
The primary innovation in the proposed model is the third element. As
discussed in Part II, for serious treatment of sexual orientation rights, rights
must be attributed both to the individual and the collective entity. Because
one's coupling preference is fundamental to one's sexual orientation, the
couple and the individual cannot be disaggregated. For a business to tell a
lesbian that she can purchase a couple-oriented product-such as a Sandals
hotel room-but can only use the product with a man is akin to asking her
to check her sexual orientation at the door. That request is analogous to
telling a woman that she can purchase a product, but only if she leaves her
genitalia behind when she enters a store,'55 and is also analogous to requir-
ing black men to shed their skin to access a particular business establish-
ment. These types of disaggregation are unacceptable, and so too is the
disaggregation of the lesbian individual and her coupling preference.
B. Defining Compliance with the Proposed Law
The model's first element defines "public accommodations" to
broadly cover all business establishments, including resorts like Sandals,
the hypothetical ballroom dance studio, and eHarmony 56 Thus, these es-
tablishments need to accommodate both opposite-sex and same-sex cou-
ples.157 The remainder of Part III.B discusses what it means for businesses
to accommodate same-sex and opposite-sex couples under the model regu-
lation. Specifically, Part III.B addresses how to define access with regard
to couples, and how to define the limits of the law's reach.
154. Those states are Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, and West Virginia.
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, EQUALITY: FROM STATE TO STATE 2005 43-50 (2005). In addition, Hawaii
has pending legislation to expand its proscription of sexual orientation discrimination in public
accommodations. Id. at 45. Hawaii already prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in public
accommodations that receive state financial assistance. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 368-1 (2004).
155. Although I do not endorse defining womanhood by physiology alone, courts have suggested
that certain physiological characteristics are essential to the female sex. See, e.g., Michael M. v.
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 467 (1981) (justifying a sex-based classification by noting the
"immutable physiological fact that it is the female exclusively who can become pregnant') (quoting
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 601 P.2d 572, 574 (Cal. 1979)).
156. For purposes of this Essay, I assume that the proposed law would be enacted in such a
fashion that these businesses would satisfy any jurisdictional requirements related to the law's
enforcement.
157. This requirement would be subject to a reasonableness limitation. See infra Part III.B.2.
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1. Defining Access with Regard to Couples
As noted above, coupling preferences are inextricably linked to sexual
orientation, and businesses distinguishing between opposite-sex and same-
sex couples discriminate per se based on sexual orientation. Thus, to satisfy
the proposed model's protection of equal access to public accommodations,
businesses must not limit access by distinguishing between opposite-sex
and same-sex couples. Furthermore, as dictated by the moral theories de-
veloped earlier in this Essay, entities considered "couples" include poten-
tial couples as well as long- and short-term couples. 58 As a result under the
proposed law, businesses like Sandals are not permitted to bar lesbian cou-
ples from honeymooning at their couples-oriented resort. At the ballroom
dance studio, two men wishing to dance in a same-sex pairing must be al-
lowed to do so, even if they are not a long-term romantic couple. Finally,
eHarmony is not permitted to match only opposite-sex couples.
Of course, requiring these businesses to accommodate same-sex cou-
ples simply means they need to provide same-sex couples with access.
Niche marketing itself is not illegal. They may continue specializing their
products and services by catering to opposite-sex couples. For example, an
instructor at the dance studio may choreograph his dances with opposite-
sex couples in mind. He might formulate a partnered dance where one
partner's gestures convey masculinity while the other's gestures adopt a
feminine role. However, the instructor cannot prevent two women from
defying gender stereotypes by paying the studio to learn the instructor's
dance.' 59 Similarly, a dating service may specialize in matching either op-
posite-sex or same-sex couples; however, it may not explicitly refuse ac-
cess"6 to individuals who view themselves as belonging to the non-targeted
type of "potential" couple. This right of access for sexual minorities paral-
lels the inclusion required of businesses targeting a niche market based on
race. In jurisdictions with capacious definitions of "public
accommodations," a dating service may specialize in matching
158. See supra, Part II.C.
159. Requiring businesses to disaggregate their notions of sex and gender is nothing new. For
example, businesses often advertise their products as "women's products." These businesses range
from Chippendales to "women's" shoe stores to a shop like Jessica McClintock, which specializes in
frilly dresses. Despite the feminine nature of these establishments, Chippendales may not bar men from
viewing its shows; the shoe store cannot stop a man from trying on a pair of stiletto heels; and Jessica
McClintock cannot stop a man from holding a dress up against himself while peering into a store
mirror. For an example of relevant case law, see Easebe Enterprises, Inc. v. Rice, 190 Cal. Rptr. 678
(Ct. App. 1983) (revoking a liquor license from. Chippendales, a cabaret bar offering striptease
performances geared towards female audiences, because it violated California's public
accommodations law by prohibiting male customers from entering its premises during the dance
performances).
160. In the case of online dating services, I define "access to service" as the ability to purchase
matching services, not the ability to log on to the website. Reasoning by analogy, I see being able to log
on but unable to purchase services as similar to being permitted to walk into a restaurant but being
refused a table and menu.
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Asian-American couples and may advertise this specialization, but may not
refuse access to patrons of other races.16"'
Online dating services like Match.com, Lavalife, Salon Personals, and
Gay.com already satisfy the proposed law. 62 The first three services ask
patrons to complete a profile that specifies their sex as well as the sex of
their desired partner. On Match.com, patrons may fill in the first blank with
either "Man" or "Woman," and the second blank with "Men" or "Women."
Similarly, on Lavalife, the options for both blanks are "Male" and
"Female." On Salon Personals, patrons have more options; they must spec-
ify whether they are a "man,". "woman," "couple (m/f)," "couple (m/m),"
or "couple (f/f)," and whether they are looking for a "man," "woman,"
"man or woman," "couple (m/f)," "couple (m/m)," or "couple (ff)." By
framing their profile surveys in such fashion, these dating services match
both same-sex and opposite-sex couples. In the case of Salon Personals, the
service also facilitates polyamorous unions. 63
Gay.com also provides access to all types of potential couples. The
service simply prompts patrons with the question: "Find __ ." Patrons
may select from "Men," "Women," "MTF," ".FTM,''1M and "All." Gay.com
also asks its patrons whether they consider their sexuality to be "gay,"
"lesbian," "bisexual," "straight," "queer," or "questioning." One's answer
to the sexuality question does not limit the options from which one may
choose to complete the "Find " query. Gay.com is a business that
161. Although there are no reported cases in which people have sued dating services for serving
only a particular race, I assume that refusing access to these services based on race is illegal because
exemptions to public accommodations laws are so narrowly defined. See supra notes 132-137 and
accompanying text (discussing exceptions to public accommodations laws). Also, consider
Click2Asia.com, http://www.click2asia.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2005), an online dating service that
specializes in matching Asian Americans but does not bar non-Asian Americans from accessing its
services, and JDate, http://www.jdate.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2005), an online dating service that
specializes in matching Jewish couples but does not bar non-Jews from accessing its services. It may
seem ironic to subject dating services to antidiscrimination laws since dating inherently involves
discrimination. For example, if a woman decides to date only white men, she is discriminating against
women and racial minorities. However, an individual who discriminates among potential partners can
be distinguished from a dating service that discriminates against potential customers. In the former
situation, antidiscrimination principles are outweighed by the individual's freedom to choose her
intimate associations; in the latter situation, there is no intimacy interest between the business and its
potential customers. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 631-34 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[C]ertain personal relationships or decisions are protected from government
interference .... [However, the] Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose employees,
customers, suppliers, or those with whom one engages in simple commercial transactions, without
restraint from the State.").
162. See, e.g., Match.com, http://www.match.com; (last visited Apr. 21, 2005); Lavalife.com,
http://www.lavalife.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2005); Salon Personals, http://personals.salon.com (last
visited Apr. 21, 2005); Gay.com, http://www.gay.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
163. For an explanation on why this Essay's proposed law does not address polyamory, see supra
note 64.
164. The categories "MTF" and "FTM" account for transgendered persons. MTF stands for "male
to female," while FTM stands for "female to male."
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heavily markets itself to the gay community, but the service accommodates
diverse sexual orientations by providing access to same-sex couples, oppo-
site-sex couples, and couples that include transgendered persons.
In contrast to the aforementioned services, eHarmony refuses to match
same-sex couples. 165 Its customer profile survey requires patrons to identify
their own sex; afterwards, eHarmony presumes that each patron is seeking
a partner of the opposite sex. This presumption results in providing access
only to opposite-sex potential couples. Under the proposed law, eHarmony
would be required to modify its website and its compatibility survey to
provide selection options for same-sex couples, that is, unless it could in-
voke one of the bona fide business interests described in Part III.B.2.
One might ask why public accommodations laws should regulate
businesses like eHarmony when other services such as Gay.com already
match same-sex couples. The answer lies in recognizing that Gay.com's
inclusion cannot remedy the stigmatization produced by eHarmony's ex-
clusion. Consider an analogous case based on race: the mere existence of a
restaurant that welcomes black patrons cannot remedy the wound inflicted
by a restaurant down the road with a sign saying "No Blacks." Even if race
and sexual orientation discrimination are not equivalents, exclusion in both
contexts inflicts a significant wound.166 Indeed, commentators have already
criticized eHarmony's policy as unjust.'67
2. Bona Fide Business Interests as a Limiting Principle
The right of access created by public accommodations laws has never
been absolute. 6 ' Across various jurisdictions, policymakers and courts
have exempted businesses that justify discrimination with a bona fide busi-
ness interest. This Essay proposes preserving that tradition by including a
"bona fide business interest" exception in the proposed law. To clarify the
exception, I discuss three types of business interests and evaluate their mer-
its. Part III.B.2.a asserts that businesses do have a bona fide business inter-
est in protecting patrons against compelled bisexuality. Forcing bisexuality
upon patrons jeopardizes patrons' liberty interests in developing their own
notions of sexual identity. Similarly, Part III.B.2.b contends that businesses
do have a bona fide business interest in discriminating when compliance
with the proposed law creates an undue burden. However, Part III.B.2.c
165. See supra note 1.
166. On the wounds associated with exclusion, see supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. On
why it is appropriate to sometimes analogize between race and sexual orientation discrimination, see
Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies-Identity and "Passing": Race and Sexual
Orientation, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 65 (1997); Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual
Rights and "The Civil Rights Agenda," I AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REp. 33 (1994).
167. See supra, notes 1-2.
168. See discussion supra at notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
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argues that businesses do not have a justification for discrimination simply
because compliance with the proposed law requires product modification.
a. Preventing Compelled Bisexuality
Couple-oriented businesses have a legitimate interest in avoiding
compelling, or inadvertently privileging, bisexuality when providing equal
access to diverse couples. In some contexts-such as square dancing asso-
ciations and dating services-businesses might find that removing distinc-
tions between types of couples creates a bisexual norm. In the exceptional
cases where privileging bisexuality is a concern, businesses should be per-
mitted to satisfy the proposed law by offering separate-but-equal access to
different types of couples. This is because replacing the traditional hetero-
sexual norm with a bisexual norm merely replaces one form of discrimina-
tion with another.
One type of exceptional case privileging bisexuality involves the
commingling of couples. By using the term "commingling," I am referring
to circumstances where couples actually swap partners, blurring the lines
between sets of couples. For illustration purposes, substitute the hypotheti-
cal ballroom dance studio with a square dance association that qualifies as
a public accommodation.1 69 In the case of square dancing, individuals do
not only dance with primary partners; dance steps often require switching
partners. If a same-sex couple and an opposite-sex couple participate in the
same square dance, they may end up switching partners with each other. In
effect, all dancers at an integrated square dance face the possibility of
dancing with partners of both the same and opposite sex. Therefore, in the
case of square dancing, the commingling of couples enforces a bisexual
norm. One possible solution for the square dance establishment is to offer
one night of the week to satisfy lesbian patrons and another night of the
week for gay men. However, the duty to offer separate-but-equal access is
only required insofar as such offerings do not create an undue burden. 70
One might argue that the commingling of couples is no more objec-
tionable than the commingling of races. For example, an Asian-American
couple may wince at the thought of swapping partners with a Latino cou-
ple. Should that visceral wince justify segregating Asian-American dance
partners from Latino partners? The difference between race and sexual ori-
entation is that racial identity is not inextricably linked with one's rela-
tional status in a couple whereas one's sexual orientation necessarily
169. Based on their activities and membership criteria, some private associations may not qualify
as public accommodations. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
170. As I discuss in the subsection on undue burdens, infra Part III.B.2.b, "equal" in "separate but
equal" is tempered by feasibility concerns. Thus, the square dance association should only need to offer
two nights of same-sex dancing if its financial situation renders more nights unfeasible.
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depends on relational desire.17" ' Thus, requiring the commingling of oppo-
site-sex and same-sex couples is particularly objectionable. Separate-but-
equal access is deemed satisfactory only under such circumstances.
A second type of exceptional case privileging bisexuality involves
establishments in the business of matching couples. Consider a business
like HurryDate, which matches couples online as well as offline through
"speed dating"'72 parties. Under the proposed law, HurryDate is required to
match both opposite-sex and same-sex couples. But if HurryDate does not
segregate its clientele based on sexual orientation, gay patrons could poten-
tially be matched with straight patrons, creating another sort of compelled
bisexuality. To avoid privileging bisexuality, HurryDate can offer separate-
but-equal speed dating arrangements, as long as doing so does not create an
undue burden. For example, HurryDate could partition a set of tables at the
speed dating party for gay couples and another set of tables for lesbian
couples. Alternatively, HurryDate could organize separate speed dating
events on separate evenings'73
Preventing the privileging of bisexuality is a legitimate justification
for discrimination because privileging bisexuality implicates a liberty in-
terest-namely one's right to develop her own sexual identity, which is the
liberty interest at the heart of this Essay. By compelling bisexuality, the
law suppresses the sexual orientation of gays, lesbians, and straights alike.
Liberty interests such as patrons' privacy, safety, and health have served as
bona fide business interests in the past.'74 This Essay simply extends that
rationale to the context of couple-oriented discrimination.
b. Avoiding Undue Burdens
Requiring businesses to comply with the proposed law may create
excessive financial burdens for those affected. The ADA excuses busi-
nesses from complying with its public accommodations provision if they
171. 1 acknowledge that the race of one's partner can affect one's racial identity. Eric Liu
illustrated this fact in THE ACCIDENTAL ASIAN 33 (1998), when he wrote, "[h]ere are some ways you
could say I am 'white'... I married a white woman." Nonetheless, race and sexual orientation are
distinguishable. While racial identity is possibly affected by relationships, sexual orientation is
necessarily dependent on a relational measure. Liu listed twenty-four reasons why he felt white despite
his yellow skin. Id. at 33-34. In contrast, a homosexual woman has only one reason why she is
homosexual: she directs her sexual interest towards other women. On the relational nature of sexual
orientation, see supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text. Note that, in this footnote, I use the term
"homosexual" as opposed to "lesbian." The two terms overlap, but not perfectly. While there is only
one reason why a woman is homosexual, there can be multiple reasons why women identify as lesbian.
That category has become not only a sexual orientation, but also a cultural and political identity. See,
supra note 8 (discussing lesbianism as both a sexual orientation and a political identity).
172. At speed dating parties, HurryDate appoints its patrons to a series of three-minute blind dates.
See Hurrydate.com, http://www.hurrydate.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
173. Notably, HurryDate already satisfies the proposed law because it presently offers its services
to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples. Id.
174. See supra notes 137-143 and accompanying text.
2006] 1313
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
prove that doing so imposes an undue burden, which consists of a financial
loss and the establishment's inability to absorb that loss.'75 Like the ADA,
the proposed law will expose some couple-oriented businesses to signifi-
cant financial burdens. As a result, this Essay proposes creating a bona fide
qualification for businesses that can prove an undue burden. The financial
burdens analysis is necessarily a fact-based assessment in which courts
determine where to draw the line between due and undue burdens-a line
that is essentially a question of reasonableness. With that said, there are
three principles that should guide courts' analyses.
First, the costs incurred by acting against a customer preference for
discrimination should never be deemed an unreasonable financial bur-
den. "'76 Doing so contravenes the express purpose of the law: to counter
discrimination. For example, the ballroom dance studio might argue that
providing access to same-sex couples burdens the studio with economic
loss because the studio's existing opposite-sex couples do not wish to
dance among same-sex couples. As a result, patronage from opposite-sex
couples will decrease. Under the model regulation, a business's interest in
preserving its marketability as an exclusively opposite-sex establishment
does not exempt it from the law. Customer preferences do not excuse busi-
nesses' discriminatory practices. The dance studio cannot hang a "No
Blacks" sign on its door just because some of its patrons wince at the idea
of dancing among black couples.'7 7 That reasoning translates to the context
of couples and sexual orientation.
Second, financial loss alone should never constitute an undue bur-
den.178 To assess the weight of the burden, courts should weigh the finan-
cial loss against the business's resources.' 79 Larger businesses are usually
175. In interpreting the ADA, the Department of Justice defines "undue burden" as a "significant
difficulty or expense." See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. (2005). Factors to consider include the cost of the action
needed to comply with the ADA's public accommodations provision and the overall financial resources
of the public accommodation involved. See id.
176. Customer preference generally does not create a legitimate business interest. For a discussion
on customer preference and its relation with economic loss, see supra note 138 and accompanying text.
177. Cf Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (discussing whether catering to private biases
can ever justify race-based government discrimination and noting that the government must not "bow[]
to the hypothetical effects of private racial prejudice that they assume to be both widely and deeply
held") (quoting Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 260-61 (1971) (White, J., dissenting)). In City of
Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989), the Supreme Court stated, "we do not think the Constitution
recognizes a generalized right of 'social association' that includes chance encounters in dance halls."
That lack of a constitutional right to social association suggests that there is also no right to social dis-
association that would protect one's desire not to dance among certain groups.
178. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 260 (stating that potential economic loss suffered by
public accommodations did not render the Civil Rights Act of 1964 unconstitutional).
179. This factor-balancing approach to assessing burdens is adopted from the ADA context. See
28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2005) (listing factors to balance, which include the nature and cost of extending
accommodations and the cost-bearer's overall financial resources); see also Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d
297, 305 (3rd Cir. 1994) (holding that a state-sponsored home nursing service was not required by the
ADA to accommodate mentally disabled patients because doing so would impose an "undue and
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able to absorb greater implementation costs than smaller businesses. Yet,
rather than create a minimum-employee threshold as a proxy for business
size, and consequently a measurement of a business's ability to comply
with antidiscrimination laws, 8 ° this Essay proposes that courts weigh im-
plementation costs against the resources of the relevant business on a case-
by-case basis. Because these costs will vary based on a multitude of busi-
ness-specific factors, a universal minimum-employee threshold does not
serve as a useful proxy for a business's compliance capacity. Consider that
a low-budget, couple-oriented bed-and-breakfast may simply need to omit
the words "opposite-sex couples only" from their advertising materials.
Meanwhile, a company like eHarmony may need to alter its website and
quite possibly its compatibility test in order to provide access to same-sex
couples. The burdens presented by these changes must be weighed against
the companies' resources to determine whether the burdens are undue.
Third, in separate-but-equal cases, courts should consider the feasibil-
ity of implementing separate channels of access. For example, if HurryDate
has no demand for gay and lesbian speed dating, it is unreasonable to re-
quire the service to designate part of its speed dating parties to same-sex
matching, only to have no one show up. The costs associated with that
move are unreasonable. However, if there is even a small demand for
same-sex matching, HurryDate must accommodate the individuals seeking
it, even if the service would incur financial loss,' unless it does not have
the resources to absorb the loss. If someone makes a prima facie case
showing that HurryDate underservices the gay and lesbian community, the
business has the burden of proving that it faced an unreasonable financial
burden in providing separate channels of access.
c. Averting Product Alterations
Borrowing from the language of the ADA, some business establish-
ments might protest that providing access to both opposite-sex and same-
sex couples requires them to fundamentally alter their products, and that
averting such fundamental alterations is a bona fide business interest. This
perhaps impossible burden on the State, possibly jeopardizing the whole program..."); Roberts v.
Kindercare Learning Ctrs., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 921, 927 (D. Minn. 1995) (holding that a daycare center
would be unduly burdened by accommodating a disabled child because it was "on a shoestring budget,"
lacked adequate personnel, and had a parent corporation that was just coming out of bankruptcy)
(internal quotations omitted).
180. Some laws have taken this route. For example, Congress included a minimum-employee
threshold in Title VII, limiting the law's reach in order to protect small businesses from unreasonable
implementation and litigation costs. See Jeffrey A. Mandell, Comment, The Procedural Posture of
Minimum Employee Thresholds in Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1063
(2005) (discussing the legislative history behind Title VII's minimum-employee threshold).
181. Cf McCabe v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161 (1914) (rejecting
the argument that, under the pre-Brown separate-but-equal race regime, limited demand by blacks and
its potential effect on profits justified providing luxury train cars for whites only).
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claim is weak because the ADA is distinguishable from the proposed law.
ADA jurisprudence is unique in that it sets a particularly high bar for com-
pliance. Unlike the proposed law, which only protects equal access, the
ADA protects equal access and enjoyment.'82 Although the language of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 also includes the words "equal enjoyment," the
Supreme Court has suggested that, in the context of the Civil Rights Act,
"enjoyment" is synonymous with "access." '183 This conflation, however, is
not present in ADA jurisprudence. Because the ADA sets a higher bar for
compliance, it also warrants a more expansive limiting principle. The
ADA's expanded limiting principle does not transfer to the proposed law
because the proposal only requires businesses to guarantee equal access.
The fundamental-alterations argument generally arises in ADA litiga-
tion when a disabled person has already gained access to an establishment
but demands that the establishment be modified so she can derive equal
utility. In one case, a disabled golf player, who had already gained access
to a professional golf tournament, demanded the use of a golf cart in order
to protect his enjoyment of the tournament.'84 The court found that provid-
ing the plaintiff with cart privileges did not fundamentally alter the tour-
nament.185 In contrast, a disabled hockey player, who already gained access
to an ice hockey league, demanded that he be allowed a relative with him
on the ice to direct his moves. 18 6 In that case, the court held that, although
the plaintiff required the presence of a relative on the ice to protect his en-
joyment of the game, allowing the relative on the ice fundamentally altered
the game. 187
Unlike ADA jurisprudence, the proposed law creates only a right of
access, not of enjoyment. Thus, to the degree that product alteration is nec-
essary to provide access to both opposite-sex and same-sex couples, those
alterations should be enforced, subject to the limits justified by undue bur-
dens and compelled bisexuality. This principle is not new. Consider a hy-
pothetical 1950s-themed diner. The diner might argue that it must racially
segregate its seating in order to accurately emulate a diner from the 1950s.
Accordingly, it wants to relegate black patrons to undesirable tables near
the restrooms. In this case, access (to the diner's desirable tables) is inter-
twined with the product itself (a 1950s theme). To grant equal access to
black patrons, the diner must desegregate. Compelling the diner to
182. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000) ("No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation.") (emphasis added).
183. See supra note 130.
184. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998), affd 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.
2000) and 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
185. Id. at 1253.
186. Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217 (ED. Mo. 1996).
187. ld. at 224.
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desegregate its seating modifies its product's hallmark-a fundamental
component of the diner's business product. However, the diner may not use
fundamental alterations to justify discrimination.
Similarly, attempts to avert product alterations do not justify discrimi-
nation in the couples context. In the case of eHarmony, access and product
are also intertwined. A gay man qua gay man cannot use eHarmony be-
cause of the way eHarmony's product is currently fashioned. To use
eHarmony, the gay man must adopt a pseudonymous heterosexual identity
and use eHarmony to meet women. In order to match same-sex couples,
eHarmony needs to change its website. Depending on the mechanics of its
computerized matching program, a dating service like eHarmony might
also need to change the program's algorithms. Looking beyond eHarmony,
one can hypothesize the mechanics of an imaginary dating service, eDuet.
Hypothetical v. 1: eDuet's compatibility program, originally created
for opposite-sex matching, is directly applicable to same-sex
matching. For example, the compatibility program might simply
match partners based on complementary interests-interests in
music, sports, religion, etc. eDuet can use this exact same test to
match same-sex partners. eDuet would need only to discern its
patrons' sexual orientation and run a filtering mechanism to
prevent inadvertently compelling bisexuality by, for example,
matching two straight men with complementary interests.'88
Hypothetical v.2: It is possible that the compatibility program
requires additional tweaking. The compatibility survey may contain
questions applying only to certain types of couples. For example,
say eDuet asks a stream of explicitly sexual questions regarding
vaginal sex. Because gay men qua gay men cannot answer these
questions, eDuet needs to modify its compatibility survey either by
letting gay men check off an "N/A" box or by coming up with an
alternative survey altogether that matches gay male couples." 9
At this point, I can imagine some readers' eyes widening in disap-
proval at the suggestion that eDuet needs to modify its compatibility test.
One might argue that requiring an "N/A" box is like requiring Victoria's
Secret to start stocking lingerie in men's sizes. But the Victoria's Secret
analogy falls short. Requiring Victoria's Secret to change is objectionable,
whereas requiring eDuet to change is not. In the case of Victoria's Secret,
product and access are not intertwined. Even if Victoria's Secret does not
reform, men qua men have access to the store: a man can walk into
Victoria's Secret, buy a bra for himself to wear, walk out of the store, and
call himself a man throughout that process. Conversely, a potential gay
188. On compelled bisexuality, see supra Part Ill.B.2.a.
189. 1 should note that even eHarmony's 436-question survey does not contain any questions that
are so clearly inapplicable to gay male couples. To my knowledge, eDuet is a hypothetical extreme.
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male couple qua gay male couple can never answer questions about how
they prefer to perform vaginal sex with each other. In the case of eDuet,
product and access are intertwined. In that sense, eDuet's sexually explicit
compatibility program is more akin to the fifties diner than to Victoria's
Secret. Unless the product is modified, access is denied. 9
Certainly, eDuet can argue that developing a survey catering to gay
men creates an undue burden. However, eDuet would need to prove it.
Like eHarmony, eDuet can argue that it expended a great deal of resources
studying heterosexual couples to create its existing compatibility pro-
gram. 199 However, that fact alone does not exempt eDuet from the pro-
posed law. What if eDuet had studied only white couples? It would be
equally objectionable if eDuet were to rely on that premise to justify bar-
ring all non-whites from accessing its dating service.
eDuet need not guarantee that its compatibility program is useful to
gay men. It need only guarantee access. Perhaps eDuet's compatibility
program-after adding all the "N/A" options-simply does a poor job of
matching gay male couples. The question of whether gay men want to pur-
chase a potentially useless service is for gay men to decide. Consider this
analogy: an Asian-American woman with straight hair may find useless a
hairstylist who specializes in relaxing African-American hair. It is one
thing for the Asian-American woman to decide for herself that the stylist's
services are useless to her. But it is another thing entirely for the stylist to
hang a "Blacks Only" sign in his window.
As mentioned above, deciding not to purchase a useless product is
empowering. The customer is exercising her freedom of autonomous deci-
sion-making. Excluding someone from that decision-making process in-
flicts injury. The excluded party is left to question why she was excluded,
and human dignity is implicated. The Supreme Court reminds us that
"deprivation of personal dignity ... surely accompanies denials of equal
access .... "192 Under that reasoning, businesses should be required to pro-
vide equal access, even in cases where access and product are intertwined,
causing some businesses to alter their products.
190. One might raise gynecologists and sperm banks as examples of businesses in which access
and product are intertwined. There is no way a man himself can use a gynecologist's services. Similarly
there is no way a woman can donate to a sperm bank. Should the gynecologist and sperm bank be
required to modify their services? They would likely be excused under most existing laws due to health
and safety concerns. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. Also, one could argue that requiring
the gynecologist to learn another medical specialization and requiring the sperm bank to develop egg-
donor facilities would create undue burdens.
191. On eHarmony, see supra note 1.
192. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250 (internal quotation marks to the Senate Commerce
Committee speaking on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 omitted); see also Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 625 (1984) (holding that sex-based discrimination in public accommodations
"deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide participation in
political, economic, and cultural life").
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Of course, an underlying assumption to the eDuet hypothetical is that
eDuet has no cognizable constitutional claim to free expression or free re-
ligious exercise. eDuet would need to be more than a commercial service
provider to make a successful claim under the First Amendment; 19 3 it
would need to be a membership organization or a religious group whose
group identity hinges on objections to same-sex relationships. If the First
Amendment is implicated, a court might balance couples' rights against
group rights-the rights of religious groups and expressive associations-
in the way that courts already balance individual rights against group
rights. For example, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 94 the Boy Scouts'
right to free expression trumped a gay scoutmaster's right to nondiscrimi-
nation.195 If eDuet were a membership organization using a heterosexual
dating service to further its explicit mission of promoting heterosexuality,
it is possible that compelling eDuet to alter its service would unconstitu-
tionally compromise the message it seeks to spread.19 6
IV
CONCLUSION: PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND BEYOND
It seems that, at every turn, we are reminded of our sexual orientation.
Oftentimes, this reminder comes in the form of an activity involving cou-
pling. These reminders likely ring most loudly to sexual minorities. For
example, two gay men who attend a ballroom dance lesson with some of
193. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring):
There are, of course, some constitutional protections of commercial speech-speech intended
and used to promote a commercial transaction with the speaker. But the State is free to
impose any rational regulation on the commercial transaction itself. The Constitution does not
guarantee a right to choose employees, customers, suppliers, or those with whom one engages
in simple commercial transactions, without restraint from the State.
194. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
195. Id. at 644. The Boy Scouts successfully argued that it "teaches that homosexual conduct is
not morally straight," and that allowing gay men to serve as scoutmasters would compromise that
message. See id. at 651 (internal quotations omitted).
196. Some human rights advocates may protest my endorsement of Dale. See Raju Chebium, High
Court Allows Boy Scouts to Exclude Gays, CNN, June 28, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/
2000/LAW/06/28/scotus.gay.boyscouts.01 (quoting the Human Rights Campaign for calling Dale a
"travesty of justice"). I agree that the Boy Scouts' discriminatory policy compromises the dignity of
gay men. However, I believe that, while the government should generally proscribe sexual orientation
discrimination, it should make rare exceptions for certain private organizations. By relegating these
groups to an exception status, the government indirectly disapproves of their policies while respecting
their group autonomy. In that manner, the Dale litigation marginalized the Boy Scouts and,
consequently, the Boy Scouts suffered reduced public support. See Sheryl McCarthy, Boy Scouts'
Victory on Gays Cuts Contribution Flow, NEWSDAY, July 24, 2000, at A26. See also Katharine T.
Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and
Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2541, 2576-79 (1994) (arguing that, oftentimes, employers
claiming Title VII's bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) effectively segregate themselves,
leading social forces to mobilize against them). With that said, I believe the government should balance
competing interests better by honoring Dale but disapproving of the Boy Scouts by rescinding from the
organization any government support, such as the use of public schools for meetings. Amy Gutmann
has argued for this balancing scheme in her book IDENTITY AND DEMOCRACY, at 107-08 (2003).
2006] 1319
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
their straight friends might feel singled out, forced to suppress their sexual
orientation by dancing with women. These men are reminded that their
sexual orientation extends beyond their bedroom doors. In another exam-
ple, a group of friends attend a speed dating party together and, upon arri-
val, the sole lesbian in the group realizes that there is no table for same-sex
matching. That lesbian is reminded that sexual orientation extends beyond
bedroom doors.
These examples may seem trivial. Perhaps it is because, unlike mar-
riage-which is purportedly a once-in-a-lifetime event-these situations
occur more frequently, rendering them nothing particularly momentous.
However, it is precisely that lack of special flavor, the regularity and ubiq-
uity with which these examples arise, that makes them troubling. Every
day, heteronormative presumptions in coupled activities affirm the sexual
orientation of some people while suppressing the sexual orientation of oth-
ers. Accordingly, some are able to develop their sexual identity with rela-
tive ease while others face obstacles-even pain and suffering. For that
reason, it is imperative that lawmakers and jurists conceptualize sexual ori-
entation antidiscrimination as more than an individual right. The time is
ripe to think of sexual orientation antidiscrimination in terms of couples'
rights and public recognition.
Public accommodations laws provide fertile ground for pursuing this
goal. Many of these laws already protect against sexual orientation dis-
crimination. The question becomes how to think of sexual orientation with
regard to those laws. To ensure that regulations adequately protect against
sexual orientation discrimination, we must ensure that they prohibit busi-
nesses from discriminating between opposite-sex and same-sex couples.
This Essay proposed a preliminary model for achieving that end. Integrat-
ing same-sex couples into the couples-oriented market is likely to assuage
sexual minorities' broader struggles because increasing the visibility of
same-sex couples will diminish homophobia based on ignorance.197
This Essay can serve as a springboard for couples' rights analyses be-
yond the context of public accommodations law. In other areas of jurispru-
dence, commentators have asserted that restricting same-sex relationships
is not necessarily discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.'98
Opponents of this position often respond with under-theorized argu-
ments. "'99 This Essay provides an analytical theory to support those argu-
ments.
Consider the Lawrence v. Texas litigation, in which the Texas court of
appeals stated that Texas's same-sex sodomy ban was neutral because
"[p]ersons having a predominately heterosexual inclination may sometimes
197. On the relationship between ignorance and homophobia, see supra note 3 1.
198. See, e.g., infra notes 200, 202, and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., infra notes 201 and accompanying text.
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engage in homosexual conduct. Thus, the statute's proscription applies,
facially at least, without respect to a defendant's sexual orientation. '2°° In
her concurring Supreme Court opinion, Justice O'Connor disagreed, argu-
ing that the statute was not neutral because same-sex sodomy is "closely
correlated" to being homosexual.2 ' O'Connor's conclusion is buttressed by
an analysis in the couples' rights paradigm: the Texas statute is not neutral
with regard to sexual orientation because only same-sex couples can vio-
late the law. By its very definition, the law precludes finding that any op-
posite-sex couple committed the proscribed "crime."
Consider also same-sex marriage. There is disagreement over whether
same-sex marriage bans really amount to sexual orientation discrimination
since whether an individual can marry a woman arguably does not turn on
that individual's sexual orientation (gay, straight, and bisexual men can all
marry women); the discrimination arguably turns on sex (only women can-
not marry other women). 0 2 In a couples' rights paradigm, the key question
is not whether an individual may wed, but whether two individuals-that
is, a couple-may wed each other.203 The couples' rights inquiry focuses
on the fact that a gay couple can never get married, even though a gay in-
dividual can. By shifting the inquiry from the gay individual to the gay
couple, moving from the individualist paradigm to the couples' rights
paradigm captures why same-sex marriage bans indeed constitute sexual
orientation discrimination.
The couples' rights paradigm gives moral status to the couple as a
collective entity that cannot be reduced to the sum of its constituent parts.
Because this paradigm gives moral status to the couple, it suggests that
disparate treatment of couples is troubling even when disparate treatment
of individuals is absent-and Equal Protection jurisprudence should take
that into consideration.
While I have sketched possible implications that the couples' rights
paradigm has outside the public accommodations context, my sketches
here are by no means comprehensive or conclusive. I offer them simply to
200. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d. 349, 353 (2001), rev'd, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
201. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor reasoned that same-sex
sodomy is "closely correlated" to being homosexual because it is the "'conduct that defines the class."'
Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
202. Compare Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 (Mass. 2003) (holding that
Massachusetts' proscription of same-sex marriage unconstitutionally "deprives individuals of access to
an institution of fundamental legal, personal, and social significance-the institution of marriage-
because of a single trait... sexual orientation ... "), with Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 52 nn.1 1-12
(Haw. 1993) (suggesting that Hawaii's proscription of same-sex marriage discriminated on the basis of
sex, but not on the basis of sexual orientation).
203. Some foreign courts implicitly adopted the couples' rights paradigm when they held that
barring same-sex couples from marriage is unconstitutional. See supra note 91. In contrast, the United
States Supreme Court generally speaks of the freedom to marry as an individual right. See Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("the freedom to marry or not to marry... resides with the
individual...").
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highlight the potentially far-reaching effects of a paradigm shift and to in-
vite future discourse on aggregate rights in the sexual orientation context.
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